International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 53

Know What You Are Fighting
successor, the emir Ouakli. They added a horrifying dimension to Algerian Salafism,
one that was unprecedented in the history of pseudo-Islamist terrorism. And the
leaders of the FIS never condemned these massacres. Except in a few, rare exceptions,
the Islamist movement active at the time did not reject the horror of these group
massacres either.
FIDA: The Return of the Djazarists
Long hoping to infiltrate terrorist groups like the FIS, the Djazarist movement,
which wanted to bring together intellectuals of the Islamist movement, ended up
creating its own armed group, which carried out its first attacks in mid-1996 in
Algiers. 50 Organized in a tight-knit fashion, its smaller numbers included graduates
from universities and specialized institutions. In the capital, the FIDA targeted the
police, public figures, and intellectuals. Among its victims were a former minister of
the Interior and the psychiatrist Bousebi. The mystery surrounding this group was only
revealed when this group and its leadership were eliminated in two major operations
in Ben Aknoun and Dely Brahim.
The FIDA wanted to head all of the armed groups, according to the “tarmac”
logic promoted by the FIS. It thought that success in larger operations would ensure
its notoriety among the terrorists. Although the FIDA attacks were first attributed
to the GIA, this group quickly understood the maneuvers of the Djazarists that they
had suspected since the start of terrorist attacks. Zitouni then had the FIDA leaders
captured: Saïd Makhloufi, Mohamed Saïd, Lamara Abdel Wahab, Mahfoudh Tadjine,
and Redjem Abdelrezak. According to the sectarian and “purifying” logic of the GIA,
they were tortured, mutilated, then put to death. 51
GSPC and LIDD: GIA Dissidents
Two important area heads of the GIA, Hassan Hattab and Ali Belhadjar, rejected
Zitouni’s practices with his accomplices. Feeling that Zitouni was threatening their
own lives, they drew back with their followers to form independent groups. Hattab
formed the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). After joining the Jazara
and becoming one of its leaders, Belhadjar named his group LIDD (Islamic League
for Dawa and Jihad). Although the name did not refer to Salafism, he unhesitatingly
claimed a connection to it. Antiterrorism experts suggested, however, that the strategy
of these two groups was instead to take charge of armed groups.
50
Founded by Mohammed Saïd, Abdelrezak Redjem, who had pledged their allegiance to the GIA at
the time of Cherif Gousmi in 1994, and by Doctor Lamara Abdel Wahab, the terrorist group known as
FIDA, the Islamic Front for Armed Jihad, acted in great secrecy, unlike the GIA.
51
He recounted this episode himself in a release entitled “Justification of the Elimination of the
Djazarist Traitors” published in El Djemaa.
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