International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 48

International Journal on Criminology
crime syndicate that it had created from scratch.
In April and July 1992, the meetings held in the Zbarbar moutains, then in
August 1992 in Tamezguida, failed to unify the armed groups within the FIS: in
question, the megalomania of the future emirs. Nevertheless, the virulence of the
thugs leading the armed groups allowed the FIS to intimidate Islamist opinion and the
authorities.
Suffering from a probable inferiority complex, already belittled by the
preachers of the FIS during the time it was legal, considered to be henchmen and shady
characters, the leaders of the GIA took revenge for the slights suffered by justifying the
executions of their acolytes by that for which they were reproached before. A release
by the head of the GIA Djamel Zitouni explained the assassination of Djazarists by
the disdain they showed to the other terrorist groups and their leaders. 39 Thus enraged
against the state and against their own associates, equipped with fatwas legitimizing
violence, and interpreting “sharia” to suit their liking, these groups launched a bloody
war—against everyone.
The ultimate attempt to impose Redjem Abdelrezak 40 at the head of the GIA,
leader of the former FIS reputed to be erudite and Djazarist in culture, was easily
countered by his future assassins. Two days after the elimination of Cherif Gousmi,
fourth head of the GIA after Abdelhak Layada, killed by the security services on
September 26, 1994, a communiqué announcing the coronation of Redjem was denied
shortly after by Redjem himself. He withdrew under threats from Djamel Zitouni,
who took charge of the GIA thanks to the allegiance of his peers.
A chicken salesman known to the police for various crimes, Zitouni succeeded
the previous heads of the GIA; the first, Mohammed Allel, alias Moh Leveilley, bandit
and seller of spare parts, was the first to commit terrorist acts. Leveilley was assisted
by the criminal Ali Zouabri, former head of the Islamic bazaar in Boufarik (Blida
region) and older brother of Antar Zouabri, future GIA leader. The second head of
the GIA, Abdelhak Layada, a sheet metal worker from Baraki, was the driver of Moh
Leveilley. The third “emir” was the Afghani-Algerian Sayeh Attia, known as Djafar
El-Afghani, eliminated by the security services on February 4, 1994, during whose
brief “reign” the first throat cutting massacres began.
Cherif Gousmi, alias Abu Abdelrahman, only took charge of the GIA from
February to September 1994 but was the first to organize it according to sharia law
as this terrorist envisioned it. Gousmi developed a GIA charter, giving it a semblance
39
Zitouni legitimizes in this way the assassination of Redjem Abdelrezak, Mohammed Saïd, and Said
Makhloufi: they wanted to take charge of the GIA considering that at the time, its leadership consisted
of uneducated people. Redjem reportedly recommended that Zitouni go learn Arabic and theology
with Mohammed Saïd…
40
Spokesperson of the FIS in charge of communication.
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