International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 31

Know What You Are Fighting
The first reformists did not all call for violence to build the Islamic state. Some
preferred entryism from the top, infiltration of state institutions, like El Mawdoudi in
India and Pakistan and Hassan Tourabi in Sudan; the same for the Wahhabis in Saudi
Arabia, most of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, and the movement of Said Hawa
in Syria. This trend aimed in fact to infiltrate the government, as Islamization should,
in their view, start from the top. Participating in governments and elections, or placing
officials at the head of the state, this “entryist” trend worked to build the Islamist state
over the long term. The Islamic jihad of Zawahiri, the henchmen of Sayyd Qotb, and
the GIA critiqued and even condemned this “entryist” trend.
The brutal repression in early Islamist history; the condemnations, executions,
or assassinations of extremist leaders like Sayyd Qotb and Hassan El Banna; the events
in Hama, Syria in 1982 10 drove these entryist-Islamists to act with greater prudence.
Nevertheless, the “Brotherhood” organizations linked to the Djamaa Islamia of
Mawdoudi and the Wahhabis engaged in energetic proselytism when the opportunity
arose. These practices, including expeditions to punish the “deviant behavior” of
believers, such as the use of alcohol, prostitution, and homosexuality, were often
justified by the Dâawa Ila El Sahwa, predication and the call for awakening, to protect
the values of Islam. In Saudi Arabia, as in Algeria, militias or parallel forces of order
were organized with this intent. In Arabic, the volunteers of this “parallel police” are
known as moutataouines.
I would emphasize that at this stage, at least for the so-called moderates,
the notion of Takfir, of designating someone as an apostate, does not yet cover
governing rulers. While discrepancies in behavior—of believers and rulers—are
often highlighted, they do not yet speak of apostasy or generalized unbelief, concepts
previously reserved for colonizers. Considered in this way, “reformism” usually takes
its political arguments from daily life. The secularization which, notably in Turkey, led
to the disappearance of the Caliphate, pushed the Islamists to align their propaganda
along this axis.
Added to this were the “Brotherhood” arguments according to which socialism
and communism had invaded the lands of Islam and that post-independence leaders
had been corrupted by colonial ideas. 11 According to these “reformists,” the Oumma
islamia had fallen back into the situation of the Arabs before Islam, Djahilia (ignorance
and perverted behavior). Re-Islamization of the lands of Islam was thus an obligation
for true Muslims. This justified a politicized Islam that renounced traditionalism and
opened the doors to idjtihad for everyone.
According to these fundamentalists, Islamic society is first defined by the
nature of its political power. Thus, despite their differences, a continuity did exist
between entryists who called themselves pacifists and radicals who called for violence
10
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood suffered unprecedented repression in the city of Hama, where
hundreds of Islamist insurgents died.
11
The allusion here was aimed at the alliance between Egypt and the USSR under Khrushchev, who
became the friend of D. Abdel Nasser in the context of the Cold War between the two major powers
at the time.
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