International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 24

International Journal on Criminology
no issue of compartmentation for classification purposes. The Intelligence Division,
however, did establish a “need to know” philosophy. Thus, each investigative unit
produced operational reports that were deposited in a compartment unique to that
unit. To achieve the information-sharing goal unit chiefs plus all analysts were given
access to all compartments.
Because of this Intelligence Division approach, the civilian analyst cadre
came to carry the bulk of the information-sharing load with the FBI and other Federal
agencies. This took the form of briefings as well as extensive written documentation.
During the period from October 2008 through the end of the 12 years of the Kelly
administration, for example, Intelligence Division analysts produced almost 1,000
special reports referred to as “Sitreps”, all of which were provided to the FBI. Analyst
briefings of FBI personnel numbered in the hundreds over the 12-year period. The
link between information sharing and the analytic cadre thus became an indelible
feature of the NYPD Intelligence Division.
Legal Oversight of Intelligence
Given the sensitivity of Intelligence Division activities, legal oversight was
crucial and welcomed. The U.S. Constitution and Federal Court Guidelines—the
Handschu Guidelines—provided the overarching boundaries that Department and
Division leadership was committed and obligated to work within. That said, it
requires a legal staff to determine whether an activity crosses those boundaries,
comes close to them, and therefore should be avoided, or altered, or are within the
boundaries. If leadership fails to treat those matters with the utmost conviction—and
openly for all staff members to see—then those at lower levels are being poorly led.
The Intelligence Division was fortunate to have a vigorous and tough-minded
civilian legal counsel—Assistant Commissioner. Mr. Stuart Parker—who answered
to the Police Commissioner via the General Counsel rather than via the Intelligence
Division chain of command. Under such a structure, legal counsel could not be
ignored. Legal oversight, however, requires knowledge of what the Intelligence
Division is actually doing, not just what it tells the legal staff what it is doing. Thus,
the need for complete transparency from the ground up.
This means, first, what activity is the Division leadership commissioning;
second, how middle management is interpreting and enacting that guidance; third,
what are the detectives, analysts, and support personnel actually doing on the ground.
To address these questions, Division management implemented the following
mechanisms:
-----First, the Assistant Commissioner for Legal Matters attended
every Intelligence Division morning meeting which was where policy and
operational guidance was surfaced, discussed, and decided upon.
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