International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | 页面 17

Answering the Terrorism Challenge
-----Few, if any, foreign Security and/or Intelligence Services had
integrated civilian Intelligence analysts and investigators as thoroughly, if at
all, as the Intelligence Division had.
-----Few, if any, had an undercover program as fully imbedded into their
organization as was the Intelligence Division UC program.
-----Nor were their UC activities staffed with personnel who were
full-time employees of their organization; more typically, they used only
Confidential Informants or non-staff undercovers.
-----Finally, many seemed to be constrained by unit-specific parochial
perspectives that clearly interfered with organization-wide integration of
programs, people, and information.
While all admired the NYPD Intelligence program, structural or cultural
restraints impaired their ability or willingness to replicate important elements of it.
Vital Regional Partnerships
For starters, the NYPD is a huge organization by any measure. In 2002 when
the process of restricting it to address the terrorist threat began, there were 42,000
Uniformed MOS plus 15,000 civilians. Any organization that large and powerful
often develops a view that it can accomplish what it needs to on its own.
-----The counterterrorism philosophy of the NYPD Intelligence Division
rejected that perspective from the beginning of the 2002 re-engineering
period.
-----It needed partners to properly protect New York City from another
round of attacks—either from al-Qaeda core, al-Qaeda affiliates, or the
homegrown threat.
This view of a regional approach to intelligence operations was the foundation
of “Operation Sentry”.
The essence of Operation Sentry was that the plotting, planning, training,
and deployment of an attack on the City was just as likely to occur outside New
York City as inside. Thus, special relationships were established with local law
enforcement agencies immediately surrounding the City.
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