International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 11

Answering the Terrorism Challenge
-----One example was al-Muhajiroon, an organization created by Omar
Bakri in the United Kingdom. Bakri, eventually expelled from the UK for
extremist activity, sponsored a New York City chapter whose members
included up to 5 people eventually arrested, convicted, and sentenced for
various terrorism-related crimes.
-----Others warranting attention included, for example, Lashka e Taiba,
Hezbollah, Hamas, and every other Organization labeled as terrorist groups
by the U.S. Government whether in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle
East, or the Caucuses.
-----Nor was the danger of Iranian-sponsored terrorism ignored;
Iranian surveillance of the sensitive New York City subway line as it
entered Manhattan from Queens is a case in point; the camera surveillance
was intercepted by Transit Police and Intelligence Division Farsi-speaking
detectives quickly ended the Iranian attempt to argue they did not understand
English; the USG eventually expelled them.
Intelligence Operations: A Core Capability
A core strength the NYPD terrorism-related operations was the ability to
attract uniformed managers, supervisors, and detectives of the highest quality in
the Department. With the strong support of the 14th floor—the Commissioner—the
Division over time brought on board the best cadre of uniformed personnel in the
NYPD. Every aspect of the Division benefited, none more so than the all-important
undercover and confidential Informant units.
The Deep Undercover Program
The Intelligence Division Undercover [UC] program is arguably the most
unique in the world. It consisted of young officers—typically 22–26 years old—
almost all born abroad or first-generation, all U.S. citizens and all with native
fluency in languages ranging from Urdu to Bengali. Over time, the cadre consisted
of men and women with roots in over a dozen countries, mostly South Asia, the
Middle East, and North Africa. Instead of using experienced detectives who could
not blend in with investigative subjects, these rookies entered the Department via
the Intelligence Division rather than the Police Academy. Hand chosen, they were
smart, highly motivated, and fully understanding of the complexity of what they
were about to do as professionals.
As UCs, they never entered an NYPD facility. They went through an intense
six-month training program—training was done by the undercover unit itself, usually
in hotel rooms or locations far from New York City. The training class consisted of
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