International Journal on Criminology Volume 3, Number 2, Fall 2015 | Page 24

International Journal on Criminology
Whatever the formula that makes it possible to bring together all those who
defend and protect the country so as to expand intelligence gathering and share its
analysis in a process under the authority of the General Directorate of the National
Police (Direction générale de la Police nationale; DGPN), the DGSI, and the DGPN, it
will have to assert the existence of a General Intelligence Staff, dictated by circumstance
and the will of the interior minister. For if there is a war, it will have to be well managed.
Beyond this key problem, it remains to be seen to what extent the National
Commission for Control of Intelligence Techniques (Commission nationale de contrôle
des techniques de renseignement; CNCTR) that has been established will be able to act
given that it is rather small in composition and not open to persons with anything other
than engineering qualifications. It is possible to defend basic rights while respecting the
confidentiality of deliberations.
Jean Marie Delarue, incumbent president of the National Commission for the
Control of Security Interceptions (Commission nationale de contrôle des interceptions
de sécurité; CNCIS), offered some fairly harsh criticism that was reported by AEF Infos:
“The draft law on intelligence is not compatible with public freedoms or with the security
of the country. Thought must be given to comprehensive amendment of this document
which, as it stands, merits severe criticism.” Delarue describes the future body as a
“colossus with feet of clay. This draft law does not respect the conditions for effective
control.” The state councilor is also worried about the data collection technologies
introduced by the bill, which are clearly reminiscent of “dragnet techniques.”
The idea of investing the Council of State with the relevant authority to “inquire
into the implementation of intelligence techniques” and to have it rule “in the first
and last instance” on disputes about intelligence “through specialist training” makes
perfect sense. The institution has proven its ability to defend individual and collective
freedoms. There is still a question mark regarding the lack of any legal officer to authorize
dispensatory, exceptional, and fast-track procedures.
In fact, at least one service continues to have a judicial remit (the DGSI),
while terrorism as an organized crime still falls within that of the judicial authorities.
In addition, since 1986, efficient and effective machinery that cannot be suspected
of complacency has been established (antiterrorism judges and the Antiterrorist
Section of the Prosecutor’s Office). One might legitimately wonder, therefore, why the
government continues (the website-prohibition text was put together in precisely the
same way at the end of 2014) not to invoke a legal officer who could be established as a
national point of reference that is able to legitimize exceptionally intrusive measures in
exceptionally serious circumstances—and to enable construction of a case that holds up
in court without the use of timely anonymous reports or protected informers.
Numerous people will take fright at a document that nevertheless enables the
regulation of intelligence procedures. It is a useful, brave, and fairly balanced move,
weakened, paradoxically, by the lack of a judge offering protection in the most intrusive
sector. We have already seen how difficult it has been to handle irregular or illegal
intelligence in the context of never-ending legal proceedings and occasionally creative
jurisprudence.
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