International Journal on Criminology Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2014 | Page 69

States of Change
ico has been based generally on an official
view of the facts…Releasing information a
bit at a time allows Mexico’s government
to construct a public image of winning the
war” (Medel 2010, 22). Coupled with cartel
efforts to obscure their hand through instrumental
attacks and threats against journalists,
the resulting pressure has resulted
in near complete media blackouts in some
areas.
The Fundación MEPI (Fundación
Mexican de Periodismo de Investigación)
recently completed a six-month study of 11
regional newspapers in Mexico to gauge the
impact of cartel interference or influence
on reportage of cartel crime. The Fd. MEPI
study relied on content analysis of the papers’
coverage and interviews with journalists.
The report found that the regional
newspapers were failing to report many
cartel/narco crimes. In order to conduct the
study, Fd. MEPI constructed a list of execution-style
murders tied to cartel actions and
then compared it to regional coverage. In all
regions, the number of stories mentioning
cartel violence from January to June 2010
amounted to a small fraction of the actual
incidents. Consider for example that cartel
murders in Ciudad Juárez averaged an estimated
300 per month in 2010, but during
the study period El Norte, the regional paper
mentioned less than 10% or 30 per month.
The impact appears even greater in eastern
Mexico, where El Mañana in Nuevo Laredo
published only 3 stories out of a potential
98 in June. Areas controlled by the Gulf
and Zeta (e.g., Taumalipas) cartels appear
particularly impacted by the cartel blackout
effect with between 0-5% of cartel violence
stories reported.
The Fd. MEPI analysis is presented
in Table One. Specifically, it reviewed
the crime stories published in January-June
2010 from the following newspapers: El
Noroseste (Culiacán), El Norte (Ciudad
Juárez), El Dictamen (Veracruz), Mural
(Guadalajara), Pulso (San Luis Potosi), El
Mañana (Nuevo Laredo), El Diario de
Morelos (Morelos), El Imparcial (Hermosillo),
La Voz de Michoacán (Morelia),
and Milenio (Hidalgo). In 8 of the 13 cities
studied, the papers reported only one of every
ten narco violence stories; in the cities
with more reportage, only 3 out of 10 were
published.
The cartels do not seek simple silence
and impunity, they notably seek to influence
perception, using a type of "narco-propaganda."
This strategy employs a range of
tools. These include both violent means—
beheadings, levantóns (kidnappings), assassinations,
bombings, and grenade attacks—
and informational means—narcomantas
(banners), narcobloqueos (blockades), manifestacións
(orchestrated demonstrations),
and narcocorridos (or folk songs extolling
cartel virtues). Simple physical methods
such as graffiti and roadside signs are now
amplified with digital media.
Narcocultura and Social Banditry
The concept of social/environmental
modification is based on research into
cartels and “narcocultura” by Robert
J. Bunker and others (Bunker 1997; Bunker
and Bunker 2010a; 2010b; Hazim 2009a;
2009b) and reportage on the “Santa Muerte” 1
and “Jesús Malverde” cults by Guillermoprieto
(2009) and La Familia Michoacana
cartels with its own theological practice by
Logan and Sullivan (2009). Guillermoprieto
(2009) defines narcocultura in a broad sense
as a “twisted relationship with power” often
exemplified by corruption. In a social or
cultural context—the one we are examining
1
While Santa Muerte is often translated into English as Saint Death, a more accurate translation would be
“Sacred Death” or “Holy Death.”
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