International Journal on Criminology Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2014 | Page 67

States of Change
One key element of the security
threat resulting from disequilibrium is the
impact of transnational gangs and cartels
on sovereignty where illicit networks try
to reconfigure states. Such reconfiguration
could include erosion of state capacity (or
the exploitation of a state solvency gap),
corrupting and co-opting state organs (government,
the police, and the judiciary) in
all or part of the state—through the development
of criminal enclaves—or at the extreme
edge, state failure. State reconfiguration
is potentially a more common outcome
than abject state capture or state failure
and co-opted state reconfiguration (CStR)
where the cartels and gangs use a range of
actions to obtain social, economic, political,
and cultural benefits outside the effective
control of the state (Garay Salamanca
and Salcedo-Albarán 2010; 2011). Criminal
insurgency is the means of effecting CStR;
this process is currently in play in Brazil’s
favelas, Mexico, and many parts of central
America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras).
Criminal Insurgency
Criminal insurgency presents a challenge
to national security analysts
used to creating simulations and
analytical models for terrorism and conventional
military operations. Criminal insurgency
is different from conventional terrorism
and insurgency because the criminal
insurgents’ sole political motive is to gain
autonomy and economic control over territory.
They do so by hollowing out the state
and creating criminal enclaves to maneuver.
The capture, control, or disruption
of strategic nodes in the global system and
the intersections between them by criminal
actors can have cascading effects. The
result is a state of flux resulting in a structural
"hollowing" of many state functions
while bolstering the state’s executive branch
and its emphasis on internal security. This
hollowing out of state function is accompanied
by an extra-national stratification of
state function with a variety of structures or
fora for allocating territory, authority, and
rights (TAR). These fora—including border
zones and global cities—are increasingly
contested, with states and criminal enterprises
seeking their own ‘market’ share. As
a result, global insurgents, terrorists, and
networked criminal enterprises can create
‘lawless zones,’ ‘feral cities,’ and ‘parallel
states’ characterized by ‘dual sovereignty.’
Criminal insurgencies can exist at several
levels (Sullivan 2012):
��Local Insurgencies (gangs dominate local
turf and political, economic, and social
life in criminal enclaves or other governed
zones).
��Battle for the Parallel State (battles for
control of the ‘parallel state.’ These occur
within the parallel state’s governance
space, but also spill over to affect the public
at large and the police and military
forces that seek to contain the violence
and curb the erosion of governmental legitimacy
and solvency).
�� Combating the State (criminal enterprise
directly engages the state itself to
secure or sustain its independent range
of action; cartels are active belligerents
against the state).
��The State Implodes (high intensity criminal
violence spirals out of control; the
cumulative effect of sustained, unchecked
criminal violence, and criminal subversion
of state legitimacy through endemic
corruption and co-option. Here, the state
simply loses the capacity to respond).
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