International Journal on Criminology Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2014 | Page 48

International Journal on Criminology
However, it is more accurate to speak of
alternations and superimpositions: the
complexity of the criminal phenomenon
irremediably condemns any reductionist
approach to human behaviors, criminal or
otherwise. It seems that the criminal justice
system is permanently being reconstructed,
in conceptual, praxeological, and practical
terms, driven by the ever-renewed desire
to provide the fairest possible trial (Garnot
2009).
In order to achieve such a democratic
ambition, which is undoubtedly legitimate,
necessary, and promising, complementarity
between criminology (of the
aggressor and the victim) and criminal law
(substantial, formal, and regarding sentence
enforcement) is required. Aside from the
incontestable statement that the criminal
situation precedes the very creation of the
repressive “norm,” there can be no competition
between these disciplinary fields.
However, many interdisciplinary schools
of thought refuse to acknowledge these
obvious facts, irrespective of the scientific
approach to crime via a cross-disciplinary
rationale.
The impact of victimological theories
on the rights of victims has become
particularly apparent over recent decades.
Nevertheless, this impact remains difficult
to describe, because (oddly), the victim is
not legally defined, 2 with the science dedicated
to him her not receiving any more
unanimous definition from legal doctrine. 3
Nevertheless, it is improved scientific understanding
of victims that has allowed
their ethical rights, and more recently their
procedural rights, to be recognized. Firstly,
classical theories fitted into the positivist
epistemic framework, which took issue
with the notion of the judge placing criminal
responsibility on the accused once he or
she has been held accountable for the action
in question. The degree to which the victim
may be to “blame” in the perpetration of
the act was therefore of prime importance
in the eyes of the first victimologists, as part
of efforts to calculate the extent of the perpetrator’s
guilt. Scales of guilt led to classifications,
which were soon criticized for their
sometimes caricatured nature. However,
other proposals are worth comparing to
the most rational of the theories that succeeded
them (primarily Von Hentig 1948;
Ellenberger 1954; Mendelsohn 1956; Fattah
1967).
Secondly, reacting sometimes excessively
to research on the criminal-victim
pairing, feminist victimologists aggressively
2
See, however, article 2 (which must be enshrined in French law by November 16, 2015) of Directive 2012/29/
EU (October 25, 2012) by the European Parliament and Council, setting out the minimum standards for victim
rights and for crime-victim support and protection. This directive replaces Council Framework Decision
2001/220/JHA, according to which “For the purposes of this Framework Decision: (a) ‘victim’ shall mean a
natural person who has suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic
loss, directly caused by acts or omissions that are in violation of the criminal law of a Member State.” This can
be compared to Cario (2012, 39), according to whom “Any person who suffers must be considered a victim.
a) These sufferings must be personal, real, and socially recognized as unacceptable; b) and must justify support
for the persons concerned, ranging (depending on the circumstances) from the nomination of the act or
event, to participation in the procedures for revealing the truth, legal information, medical care, psychotherapy,
psychological or social support, and compensation.”
3
See Cario (2012) pages 42 and particularly 44: “Victimology, a branch of criminology, can be defined as
the multidisciplinary scientific discipline concerned with the overall analysis of victimizations, in their individual,
collective, and social dimensions, in their emergence, their process, their consequences, and their
repercussions, in order to favor their prevention and, where necessary, bodily, psychological, social, and/or
material reparation for the victim and/or their family.”
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