International Journal on Criminology Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2014 | Page 41

Criminal State and Illicit Economy
suburbs, responsible for massive imports of
Moroccan cannabis (worth over 1 billion
euro for a consumption of 250 tons a year)
and continuous illegal drugs flows remain
the main source of the underground economy
in France" 77 .
This represents both the suppletive
and at times alternative model of development
previously mentioned.
Geoeconomics of Counterfeiting
Counterfeiting, an industry probably
claiming millions of jobs worldwide,
serves as a social net within states and territories
where they are well rooted. Tackling
it would mean providing another future to
these employees of the illicit trade. That is
why its geoeconomics impact, from China
to Turkey, Argentina or Morocco, is generally
underrated.
While the costs are difficult to quantify,
and do not include non-monetary
damage such as illness and death, the value
of counterfeiting is estimated by the OECD
to be around $250 billion a year 78 . This figure
does not include domestically produced
and consumed counterfeits nor digital piracy.
If these were added, the total amount of
counterfeiting worldwide could be several
hundred billion dollars more 79 . In 2011, the
value of the equivalent genuine products of
the 114 million IPR infringing articles detained
at the EU external border was estimated
to be over 1.2 billion euros 80 .
What is the socio-economic cost of
counterfeiting in Europe? Despite many reports,
they tend, like a school of fish, to copy
one another. The most common estimates
evaluate at 200,000 the number of jobs lost
each year in the EU because of counterfeiting.
In France, 30,000 jobs are supposedly
at stake. These figures, persistently quoted,
serve as a reference. Yet, apparently neither
built on reliable statistical basis nor on any
comparable data, they rather reveal the absence
of a more rigorous assessment of the
socioeconomic consequences of the counterfeiting
industry 81 .
The same strategic gap has been emphasized
in the United States by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO—U.S.
Congress). Faced with the identical issue of
quantification and comparability of data, it
concludes that the socioeconomic impact of
counterfeiting on U.S. soil cannot be scientifically
evaluated for lack of reliable data 82 .
Furthermore, the more diverse
counterfeiting becomes, the more it concerns
products of daily use. In a causal
link, the more counterfeiting attempts to
penetrate official channels of distribution,
and the more we all are at potential risk of
buying fakes in good faith. There lies the
77
"l'activisme et les capacités d'adaptation des organisations criminelles issues des cités sensibles, responsables
des importations massives de cannabis marocain (plus d'un milliard d'euros pour environ 250 tonnes
de résine de cannabis consommées annuellement selon la Police judiciaire) et le déploiement continu des flux
de stupéfiants, demeurent la principale source d'irrigation de l'économie souterraine en France", Le Figaro,
October 22, 2012.
78
OECD, Magnitude of Counterfeiting and Piracy of Tangible Products: An Update, November 2009, 6.
79
Id.
80
European Commission, Report on EU Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights—Results at the
EU Border—2011, July 2012, 7.
81
Mickaël R. Roudaut, “From Sweatshops to Organized Crime: The New Face of Counterfeiting”, in Criminal
Enforcement of Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 75–95.
82
United States Government Accountability Office, Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of
Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, April 2010, 37.
39