International Journal on Criminology Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2014 | Page 25

Criminal State and Illicit Economy
That is why the traditional notions
of organized crime, corruption, and penetration
of public bodies no longer suffice to
fully embrace and understand the modern
relations between crime, illicit trades, economy,
and state. Geocriminology 3 , the geopolitics
of illicit economy, aims to expose
this reality and its impacts.
Crime is Shaping the World
Since the end of the Cold War, an unprecedented
openness in trade, travel,
communication, and finance has
created an equally unprecedented era of
economic growth and technological innovation,
for the benefit of both citizens and
consumers. Yet, as global governance struggles
to keep pace with this destruction of
barriers, massive criminal opportunities
have emerged that exploit the open market
economy.
Indeed, transnational organized
crime changed in five defining ways:
1. From a mono-activity centered on drug
trafficking, it expanded its reach investing
in various illicit trades (counterfeiting,
cigarettes, or migrants) and smuggling of
all kinds once the routes and logistics are
in place and in white-collar crimes.
2. From a centralized and vertical model,
criminal groups evolved into amorphous,
loose, adaptable, and flat transnational
networks. Should a cell or some
members be identified and arrested, the
overall network would reconfigure itself
almost naturally.
3. Criminal groups, turned illicit entrepreneurs,
refined their modi operandi
from expertise in passing borders to
penetration of the licit economy through
gained stakes and influence over strategic
markets 4 (natural resources, energy,
waste, and financial sector) while taking
advantage of new technologies to access
information, conceal their identity, and
reduce detection risk.
4. The long-time barrier between organized
crime and terrorism fell. Nowadays,
a blend of insurgency, crime, and
terrorism is at play whether in Sahel, the
Af-Pak border, or in the longstanding
example of the Andean forests (FARC 5 ,
ELN 6 , and Sendero luminoso 7 ). Many
terrorist groups, no longer or less state
sponsored while in need of sustainable
and discreet source of income, turned
to illicit trades (notably counterfeiting,
cigarette, and drugs). Hezbollah 8 ,
Abu Sayyaf Group, Al Qaeda’s Affiliates
such as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb or
4
See Infra.
5
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
6
Ejército de Liberación Nacional/National Liberation Army.
7
Shining Path.
8
In March 2006, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) busted a global network of counterfeit medicine
fuelling Hezbollah with branches stretching from Brazil to China through Canada and Lebanon. More
recently, for the U.S. Treasury Department, the "Lebanese Canadian Bank—through management complicity,
failure of internal controls, and lack of application of prudent banking standards—has been used extensively by
persons associated with an international drug trafficking and money laundering network to move hundreds of
millions of dollars monthly in cash proceeds…—as much as $200 million per month—… from illicit drug sales
into the formal financial system". "According to U.S. Government information, Hizballah derived financial support
from the criminal activities of Joumaa’s network. LCB managers are also linked to Hizballah officials outside
of Lebanon". Press release, February 10, 2011.
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