International Journal on Criminology Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2014 | Page 58

International Journal on Criminology
finally regain active control over their life as
a subject (having been robbed of this by the
crime).
The victim’s right to recognition ensures
that their state as a suffering person
is taken into account. This is a fundamental
ethical position. Recognition from others
is the basis of the victim-subject’s and the
perpetrator-subject’s humanity: “The me is
awakened by the grace of the you” (Bachelard
1935). According to Axel Honneth (1992),
social-recognition relationships are structured
around three characteristics pertaining
to love (a vector of self-confidence),
rights, (a vector of self-respect), and social
solidarity (a vector of self-esteem). Recognition
is therefore “based on the experience
of intersubjectivity [which supposes that]
the relationship is more important than the
individual” (Guéguen and Malochet 2012).
The support of those involved is an
essential accompaniment to recognition.
Supporting someone means linking oneself
to them to go where they go, at the same
time as them, and at their pace. It also means
empathetic sharing of the sufferings of the
protagonists—certainly those of the victim,
but also those of the perpetrator. Placed at
the center of the process of consideration,
the victim is the only person who knows the
suffering he or she has experienced; he or
she is the only person who knows the direction
that needs to be taken, and what the
crucial problems that need to be faced are
and what his or her needs are to be able to
resolve those problems (Rogers 1961).
Reparation must be total, full, and
effective. It means taking care of oneself and
of the other as a victimized person, taking
into account the complexity of all that has
been suffered. Material compensation is
necessary, but it is not enough (see above).
Psychological and social reparation, where
necessary, must also come into play. Similarly,
in criminal proceedings, full participation
as an active subject offers both procedural
reparation and, once the decision is
final, symbolic reparation through naming
and separation (of acts and persons).
Should it be emphasized that these
ethical positions must also benefit the perpetrator,
who, however serious his or her
acts, is still a person with fundamental human
rights, to whom the major procedural
principles must also apply? Should it be
emphasized that these rights and principles
must be shared by the immediate and close
communities to which the protagonists belong,
as well as more widely by all citizens?
If this is not the case, any attempts to restore
the social bond will remain wishful thinking.
Thanks to the work of victim support
practitioners (in the broadest sense)
and researchers in victimology, new needs
have been identified. These have finally allowed
legislators to allocate a “status” to
victims of offenses. Thus, in order not to remain
little known or unknown, the victim
must have free and quick access to the law.
All democratic societies must introduce
initiatives to provide this. Similarly, obtaining
legal aid consolidates the recognition of
every victim’s right to the valuable defense
of a lawyer. The victim can choose between
civil proceedings (an ordinary judge or the
crime-victim compensation commission)
or criminal proceedings (direct proceedings,
an ordinary complaint, or a complaint
with a claim for criminal indemnification).
Taking civil action offers real guarantees to
victims of crimes or serious offenses (the
proportionality principle must apply), or
their entitled persons. It does this by allowing
them either to engage public action (by
means of action), or to become a part of it
(by means of intervention). Although this is
an important right, victims can still struggle
to fully exercise it in everyday practices.
It is just as important to respect the
rights of victims to be received, speak, and
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