International Journal on Criminology Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2014 | Seite 37

Criminal State and Illicit Economy
Beyond the international reaction
triggered by the death of Sergueï Magnitsky,
the case, 230 million dollars seemingly defrauded,
allegedly with the complicity of
several officials in relations with Russian
organized crime, would seem, if confirmed,
to embody what the Spanish prosecutor described.
The Illicit Economy: A Suppletive
and Alternative Model of Development
A
fact often misunderstood when it is
simply considered, organized crime
and illicit markets, just as the Cold
War in the twentieth century and colonization
in the nineteenth, grew to become a new
geopolitical framework of the twenty-first
century. They influence the evolution of society
both at global and local levels as surely
as the decisions taken within the G20, the
World Trade Organization (WTO), or the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 59 . They
also fuel a double phenomenon of politicization
of crime and criminalization of politics
60 .
That is why beyond traditional divides
between North and South, developed,
emerging, and least developed economies, a
paradigm shift is probably at play whereby
'functional' states, and areas within them,
are found able to limit the criminal influence
below the limit of what can be deemed
acceptable and the others, where organized
crime and illicit trades represent both a
suppletive and alternative model of development.
A consequence of the Social Pact,
transition from Behemoth to Leviathan
(Hobbes), the legitimacy of state derives
from its ability to provide security, employment,
and reasonable prospects in climbing
the social ladder. When failing to do so, the
vacuum is often filled, in various areas of
the world, including of course within developed
countries, by criminal actors. In the
end the state loses its legitimacy. This is the
demise of the Social Pact.
The illicit economy, held up as a
suppletive and alternative model of development,
corrodes the licit sphere through
corruption and the laundering of proceeds
of crime. Thus, organized crime and illicit
markets embody a new "invisible hand" 61 .
And that is precisely the point if one wants
to truly grasp the dynamic between licit and
illicit economy nowadays. It is impossible
to understand the effect of counterfeiting
without considering the importance of this
industry for some regions and states. It is
impossible to shed light on small arms and
light weapons trafficking without considering
the role played by its intermediaries,
small players in a greater cause (reason of
state). It is impossible to understand the
complexity of irregular migration without
considering that for some economies
the money sent back home, in hard currencies,
from the migrants "lucky" enough
to land themselves an undeclared work in
Europe or North America can represent
an essential part of the national GDP, thus
contributing to prevention of social unrest.
It is impossible again to grasp the issue of
grand corruption, tax evasion, and money
59
Mickaël R. Roudaut, Marchés criminels—Un acteur global, Op. cit.
60
M. Naím, “The Drug Trade: The Politicization of Criminals and the Criminalization of Politicians”, Global
Commission on Drug Policies, January 2011, 8.
61
Mickaël R. Roudaut, Géopolitique de l’illicite—la nouvelle main invisible, Op. cit. and Marchés criminels—Un
acteur global. "In economics, the invisible hand of the market is a metaphor to describe the self-regulating behavior
of the marketplace. The idea of markets automatically channeling self-interest toward socially desirable ends
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