International Journal on Criminology Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2014 | Page 31

Criminal State and Illicit Economy
ince would range from 128,000 to 160,000
votes 32 , enough to mediate the political debate,
or even hold its key.
For the anti-mafia deputy prosecutor
of Calabria, "the 'Ndrangheta [...] controls
20% of votes, it is sufficient to switch the
majorities in our small towns" 33 .
Criminal powers are thus both
fought and courted by law abiding personnel
and corruptible individuals. Unsurprisingly,
from July 1991 to February 2008, 172
municipal councils were dissolved for operating
under mafia influence 34 .
The trial for "participation in a criminal
association" of a key figure, from the
years 1955 to 1992, seven times President
of the Council (Prime Minister), Andreotti,
leave limited room for speculation on
the national security concern reached by
organized crime penetration in Italy. The
supreme court in its October 2004 ruling
declared that "during the 1970s and through
to the spring of 1980, Andreotti enjoyed
friendly and direct relations with leading
members of Cosa Nostra and had knowingly
and deliberately cultivated a stable relationship
with Mafiosi. […] The judgment
found that Andreotti had been involved in
criminal association until spring of 1980, but
the crime was time-barred and insufficient
proof brought him acquittal for the time after
that" 35 . In other words, Andreotti was found
guilty of criminal association but the expiry
of the statute of limitation prevented any
sentence. The ruling was translated by the
Italian press in a simple acquittal.
For the U.S. Department of State,
"The proceeds of domestic organized crime
groups (especially the Camorra, the ‘Ndrangheta,
and the Mafia) operating across numerous
economic sectors in Italy and abroad
compose the main source of laundered funds.
Numerous reports by Italian non-governmental
organizations identify domestic organized
crime as Italy’s largest enterprise" 36 .
Japan
The Japanese situation can be difficult
to apprehend for western eyes. To the
opposite of criminal wisdom, yakuza (or boryokudan)
possess clearly identified offices,
give away business cards, may grant interviews,
and are the subject of fan magazines.
They can compete with traditional companies
in the hiring of graduates straight out
of business schools. The relation between
state, power, and yakuza is thus well documented
37 .
Comprising roughly 79,000 persons
divided among 22 groups (in 2012), they
are considered to have played a key role in
the decade long recession that hit Japan at
the beginning of the 1990s, to the point that
the period is often referred to as the "yakuza
recession" 38 .
32
According to the pentito Antonino Calderone (1987) and Xavier Raufer (http://www.xavier-raufer.com).
33
Le Monde, November 7, 2005.
34
Italian Parliament, Relazione annuale della Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della criminalità
organizzata mafiosa o similare 'ndrangheta', 2008, 116.
35
David Lane, Into the heart of the Mafia, 2010 (Profile books LTD), 4.
36
Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. II, March 2013, 141.
37
David Kapan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza (du Picquier editions, 2002), Thierry Cretin, Mafia(s), Op. cit., 130–
141, Foreign Policy, "The Yakuza lobby", December 13, 2012.
38
Far Eastern Economic Review, The Yakuza Recession, January 17, 2002: "Neither Miyawaki nor any other
credible commentator suggests that deflation, policy blunders, political inertia and a whole range of other factors
haven't contributed to Japan's decade-long stagnation. All the same, Miyawaki, a Tokyo University Law School
graduate, former spokesman for Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and former head of the National Police
29