International Journal of Indonesian Studies Volume 1, Issue 2 | Page 4

International Journal of Indonesian Studies Autumn 2015 Indonesia’s foreign politics 1955-1965: Between decolonisation and beacon politics Haryo Kunto Wibisono,S.AP,M.AP Faculty of Social and Politic Science, Tulang Bawang University Haryo Kunto Wibisono, S.A,M.AP is an independent scholar. His research interests are Indonesian studies and Asia-Africa studies. His email is [email protected] Abstract In Indonesian historiography, the period 1955-1965 was marked by the leadership of Ir. Soekarno facing the “end of parliamentary democracy chaos”. The prevailing spirit of the period was to build a new Indonesia after acknowledgement of its sovereignty, especially to organise Asian-African-Latin Americans nations to balance the WesternEastern Bloc. A foreign political experiment was designed by Ir. Soekarno and nationalist/communist groups through their important posts in Indonesia’s Government. It was a main factor in how Indonesia’s foreign politics sought/were able to gain international acknowledgement. The aim of this paper is to explain why Indonesia was chosen as a new power between the Eastern and Western Bloc in 19551965. It also examines the internal conditions of Indonesia when holding this line in foreign politics. Finally, the paper assesses what were the risks of these choices. Keywords: Ir.Soekarno leadership, Indonesian foreign policy, decolonisation, Cold War Page After Independence Day, August 17th, 1945, Indonesia had not been directly acknowledged by other countries, especially the former colonial Dutch. Moreover, European powers had even formed the Allies/NICA (Netherland Indies Civil Administration) to occupy their former colonies and to regain the Netherland Indies with Dutch Polisionale Actie Campaigne (also known as Operation Kraai ["Operation Crow"]) resulting in Indonesia’s focus at that early stage of independence on defensive warfare vis a vis the Dutch/Allies. Thus, during 1945-1949 the Indonesian Government focused on diplomatic strategy for many agreements, such as Linggarjati, Roem-Royen, Renville, until the Round Table Conference/KMB (Konferensi Meja Bundar) that took place in Den Hague on December 27th 1949. As the result, Indonesia gained much international sympathy and de facto acknowledgement from Great Britain, the United States of America, Australia, China, India, Iran, although Syria and Egypt were first to acknowledge Indonesian independence de jure (Snit, 1986, 23-25). 4 Introduction In his book titled, A short history of Indonesia: the unlikely nation? Brown (2003) explained that in January 1950, while Indonesia was politically independent, questions posed at the outset of the revolution concerning its aims and its methods remained largely unresolved in the eyes of many Indonesians. For some national leaders, the revolution had meant a change of regime, a change from Dutch rule to Indonesian rule, but little else. These leaders considered that the revolution was over, and the task now facing the government and the state was one of rebuilding Indonesia’s political, economic and social bases.