International Journal of Indonesian Studies Volume 1, Issue 2 | Page 14

International Journal of Indonesian Studies

Autumn 2015

economic aid for the new Indonesian development plan, and reiterated People Republic of
China’s support for Indonesia’s claim over West Irian. In June 1961, Sukarno visited the PRC
and was praised by Liu Shaoqi for his role in promoting “the great project of the bridge of
friendship between People Republic of China and Indonesia”.11
The impact of Indonesia’s cooperation with the Soviet Union and the PRC was to
eliminate Western Bloc influence. Such a situation also brought with it risks that became
more apparent after the Sino-Soviet split that was triggered by Mongolia-PRC’s conflict in
1964 and its previous support of India in the border conflict with the PRC in 1962. Even
more, the Soviet Union’s foreign policies about peaceful coexistence were ideologically cast
as communist deviation/revisionist by the PRC.12 I have argued that the Sino-Soviet split
caused a hesitation to appear in Indonesia’s foreign policies which up until then had been
strongly supported by the PKI, but the Sino-Soviet conflict affected the PKI’s internal policies
which by that time had become dominant in Indonesia’s Government. In addition, many of
Indonesia’s allies in Africa were experiencing turbulence, especially during the period 19611965. These countries included Algeria, Mali, Congo, and Ghana. This condition affected
Indonesia’s foreign agenda that was based around the Bandung Spirit and Non-Alignment.
The postponing of the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference was a result of the PRC’s refusal to
be involved in the conference that took place in Algeria. The clash of interests over the
India-Pakistan-Soviet Union conflict also impacted Indonesia’s bargaining position. It was
weakened because Indonesia should choose between Peking and Moskow.13 Weinstein
(1965) argued that the most critical point came after the Asian-African Conference 1955,
where political and ideological priorities were assumed to be important to the detriment of
the economy and education sector. (Those events) assumed that economy policies inter
Asia-Africa needed a supporting system that consists of stability, foreign politics and internal
affairs. Nevertheless, the legacy of colonialism and the Cold War climate “turbulence”
together and caused serial coup d’etats amongst 29 countries who attended in Bandung,
even war and civil war.

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The relations between Communist Party Indonesia and Ir.Soekarno’s foreign policy to confront Malaysia
through connections among the leaders of communist parties in South East Asia: in September (1964), the
leaders of four Communist parties (Zhou Enlai from China, Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, and Nguyen Chi Thanh from
Vietnam, Kaysone Phomvihane from Laos, and D. N. Aidit from Indonesia) held a meeting in Chonghua, China’s
Guang-dong province. In a keynote speech, Zhou Enlai pointed out that Southeast Asia had been the focus of a
confrontation between international revolutionary and reactionary forces (Gadis & Lewis, 2001,208).
12
The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Are Betrayers of the Declaration And the Statement. The revisionist line
advanced by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. is the opposite of the revolutionary principles
of the Declaration of 1957. The 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. created grave confusion in the international
communist movement; Together with other fraternal Parties,the Communist Party of China conducted a
principled struggle against Khrushchov's revisionist line at the Moscow Meeting, (Peking Review, 1966, 9).
13
“The Second African-Asian Conference Should Be Postponed. If the Soviet Union can participate in the
African-Asian Conference, then other countries in Europe,America and Australasia, too, can participate. What
kind of an Afro-Asian conference would this be? Since a matter of principle is involved, we will never agree”
(Peking Review, 1965, 8-11).

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