Intelligent CIO Africa Issue 09 | Page 18

TRENDING “Equifax stated that the investigation is “substantially complete,” but wisely added that “it remains ongoing and is expected to be completed in the coming weeks.” For lower-level criminals, the expenses associated with criminal activities will get even lower. SSNs are already cheap; on one AVC (Automated Vending Cart) site, there are over 3.4 million SSNs for sale at only $1. This includes full names, addresses, and – for a large number of accounts – dates of birth. In California alone, there were 334,000 SSNs for sale. With tens (and potentially hundreds) of millions more SSNs potentially entering the market, the opportunities for criminals to commit fraud will increase and the price will decrease even more. So far, I’ve focused heavily on SSNs – but credit card information was also accessed in the breach. While this number is hundreds of thousands (209,000), it is unlikely to have a significant impact on an already burgeoning black market for credit card information. Enablement of nation state campaigns Although Equifax claimed this intrusion was conducted by a criminal threat actor, it is possible that this was a nation state actor. In the event that a nation state actor is responsible for the intrusion, then like the OPM breach, we won’t see the data being monetised in the criminal underground. The stolen data will be leveraged to enable nation states’ campaigns against their intelligence targets. Enablement of hacktivist campaigns If we are going to consider nation state actors, we should also consider 18 INTELLIGENTCIO hacktivist threat actors and their activities around the stolen data. If hacktivists were responsible (I think this is a pretty unlikely scenario) you could expect to see them use the data to target organisations and individuals that run counter to their world views. Embarrassment and doxing, hacktivist go-tos, would come into play. What enterprises can learn from the Equifax breach 1. Incident response takes time and eradication in particular takes time. Equifax said that the intrusion was discovered on 29th July and that they “acted immediately to stop the intrusion”. Equifax’s goal was to contain the adversary that first day, but that true eradication took much longer. It is important that you set expectations with your leadership into how long eradication could actually take. 2. Third party risks raise their ugly head once again. Some aspects of this intrusion remind me of the September 2015 T-Mobile breach. In this intrusion, Experian was hosting T-Mobile data that an unauthorised party accessed and this resulted in the loss of 15 million individual’s records. Any organisation with a business-to- business relationship with Equifax needs to find out the scope of any potential loss of their employee or customer data. This third party exposure also highlights the need for third party risk monitoring. 3. Crisis communication is key. Effectively communicating during an intrusion is important, it won’t absolve you of your sins, but doing it wrong could make the situation far worse. Understanding when and what to communicate is also important. Equifax discovered the intrusion on 29 July and notified on 7 September. Some might ask why did it take so long for the notification, but I don’t think a month is that long. The investigation needs to be far enough along so that you can confidently communicate the situation. A CEO that comes out 2 days after a breach and then minimises what is a much more significant threat will be performing a mea culpa in little time. 4. GDPR will change the breach notification game. Now let me really trip you up, how would this situation play out if it was after 25 May 2018 and Equifax lost European Union citizen’s data? General Data Protection Regulation changes everything with 72-hour breach notification windows. GDPR states, “This must be done within 72 hours of first having become aware of the breach.” When the fines do come into place, the timing of the communication will have a significant impact. What consumers can learn from the Equifax breach 1. Consider taking advantage of Equifax’s offer. Although the irony is not lost to me, taking advantage of credit file monitoring and identity theft protection offers is important. If you don’t want to use Equifax for these services, I get it, look for alternatives with someone like Transunion or Experian. 2. Be vigilant about your payment card activity. Use email/SMS alerts to notify of account transactions over and under a specific amount. If an unauthorised transaction occurs you can be notified immediately, and can quickly take action. Be vigilant about your card activity and alert your bank about any suspicious activity. 3. Address tax fraud with IRS Form 14039. If you find out you are a victim of tax return fraud, there are still things you can do. Victims can file and send a IRS Form 14039. 4. Check your Explanation of Benefits (EOB) statement. It might look like another piece of spam mail, but it is important to reconcile the EOB statements that your insurance sends you. This is your best bet to monitor for medical card fraud. Make sure to report any unfamiliar activity as soon as you observe it. 5. Assume breach. In the corporate cybersecurity world, we have learned to ‘assume breach’. Consumers should also operate under the impression that their confidential data has been compromised. n www.intelligentcio.com