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Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3091 et seq., and ad- mission of an alien necessary for the U.S. to comply with obligations to the U.N. are exempt from Title II. 22. U.S.C. § 9530. In addition, Title II does not apply to activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- tion (“NASA”). Id. § 9531. 4. Presidential Waiver and Termi- nation Requirements for waiver unique to certain sections of Title II are set forth above in the discussion of each section. In addition, subject to congressional review required by § 9511, the President may waive any sanction the President has imposed under Title II if the President deter- mines such a waiver is in the national security interest of the U.S. § 9530(b). B. Title III - Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act Title III targets North Korea by (1) barring US financial institutions from opening or maintaining accounts used by foreign financial institutions to provide indirect financial services to North Korea, § 9221a; (2) direct- ing the President to withhold assis- tance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151, et seq. from any country receiving from or providing to North Korea any defense article or service, § 9223; (3) banning goods produced in whole or part by North Korean laborers, §§ 9241(b) (3), 9241a, 9241b; and (4) requiring sanctions against any foreign person who knowingly employs North Kore- an laborers, id 4 . Presidential waiver of sanctions requires only submis- sion of a written determination from the President to Congress. Id. § 9228. Waivers are renewable for periods of between 30 days and 1 year. Id. Suspension and termination are also available upon the President’s certifi- cation to the appropriate congressio- nal committee in compliance with §§ 9251 and 9252. III. PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OR ATTEMPTED VIOLATION Penalties for violating or attempting to violate CAATSA sanctions are pro- vided for by IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. Where possible, these include civil penalties of $250,000 or twice the transaction amount, and criminal penalties up to a $1 million fine and/ or 20 years imprisonment. 50 U.S.C. § 1705. IV. AVOIDING SECONDARY CAATSA SANCTIONS Identifying conduct directly sanc- tionable under CAATSA is relative- ly straightforward. These “primary sanctions” are explicitly set forth by CAATSA. However, compliance is complicated by CAATSA’s require- ment that the President to impose sanctions against individuals and entities both in the U.S. and abroad, even when it seems conduct has nothing to do with the U.S. Such in- stances are often referred to as “sec- ondary sanctions.” 5 These sanctions are aimed at quelling even indirect support for the targeted regimes. Id. This makes risk assessment difficult because the presence of sanctionable activity may not be readily apparent. Id. Individuals and entities alike are re- sponsible for ensuring that they do not engage in dealings that could result in sanctions. Id. Further, they must avoid assisting others who are already designated for sanctions, lest they will be sanctioned them- selves. Id. Therefore, development of a compliance program that includes a sanctions list screening and other measures, depending on the unique requirements of each business, is strongly encouraged. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), in essence, wants individu- als and entities in industries subject to CAATSA to ensure they are not do- ing business in such a way that would (1) assist or support others in evad- ing sanctions or (2) supply resourc- es – i.e. products and services – that would aid others in evading sanc- tions. Id. In the financial industry, this means foreign banks that do not comply with CAATSA can be blocked from any transactions using the U.S. dollar, which is probably a death sen- tence for most banks. Id. Considerations in assessing risk should include, for example, whether an individual or entity is: 1. Transacting business in the U.S.; 2 2. Transacting business in Iran, North Korea, or Russia; those listed as an SDN or appearing on other OFAC restricted party lists, or a company owned 50% or more by such parties; 3. Engaging in transactions with 4. Using the U.S. dollar or financial system; and 5. Engaging in transactions that could be viewed as “significant” or as supportive to sanctioned par- ties. Id. There is a presumption that anything produced by any North Korean citizen or national anywhere in the world is a result of forced labor. Id. This presumption can be rebutted only if the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection finds by clear and convincing evidence that the goods were not produced by convict, forced, or indentured labor. Id. 3 “U.S. Sanctions Laws: Dangers Ahead For Foreign Companies (Part II), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/u-s-sanctions-laws-dangers-ahead-for-18252/ last accessed on June 11, 2019 37