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The observation in many zones of weak governance is that ( control of ideology , resources , state policy and the use of force ) all four forms of power , according to ( Mann 1986 ), are in the hands of the ruling elite cliques . In the face of perverse and harmful incentives , the quality of trust that should galvanise the teeming population into a strong voice appears to be missing , and citizens don ’ t seem to be leveraging their social ties into any form of emancipative , elite-challenging action . ( Apampa 2005 ) and ( Apampa 2008 ) suggest that in a zone of weak governance like Nigeria , there is mutual capture between business and civil society , business and government , and government and civil society . So the locus of control cannot be in civil society alone .
An Eccentric Locus Of Control Is Required ( Apampa 2008 ) concludes by saying the locus of control needs to be eccentric to business , government and civil society without limiting the contribution each sphere can make towards governance as described above , no matter how imperfectly . This means that in such zones , you need business to be self-regulating , government to provide formal bureaucratic regulation and civil society to conduct its activism , as these would all be necessary . However , they are insufficient to control the complex agency conundrum faced by corporate bodies , and something more outside of or eccentric to them is required .
Let us , for the sake of argument , construct an entity called a ‘ Guardian ’ in whom to locate this new locus of control . The ‘ Guardian ’ would have to be benevolent and keen on moderating the interactions between Government , Business and Civil Society in ways that ensure the norm of reciprocity is in operation ( you cheat a participant and the whole system delivers a punishing effect more significant
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than the crime ), rules are clear and followed . The participants share certain minimum , internationally acceptable values and beliefs . This is reminiscent of the ‘ Guardians ’ and ‘ Philosopher Kings ’ described in Plato ’ s Republic ( Lane 2016 ). As we are not likely to find many such humans that will combine all these things , at all times , in perpetuity , especially given the challenges of weak governance zones , there might be a need to bring several components together to approximate the functions of this ‘ Guardian ’.
One component of the ‘ Guardian ’ might be to act as an Ombudsman who could take up issues on behalf of an aggrieved party . Such an Ombudsman would need to operate a public feedback mechanism , which could be technology-driven for efficiency allowing reports to come in real-time through messaging , voice , data , etc . The Ombudsman would need a real connection with the three groups of government , business and civil society to follow up on cases . The Ombudsman would also need to be supported with an accountability mechanism that ensures the system can deal out consequences : sanctions for deviance and incentives for compliance . There must be a way to make the rules transparent and easy to monitor by all participants .
This arrangement differs from the Clan Mechanism of Control and could be considered a loosely coupled system . One can compensate for loose-coupling ( Orton and Weick 1990 ) by providing appropriate leadership , focusing attention on specific relations in the system and promoting a system of shared values which must form part of the terms of reference for the ‘ Guardians ’ of the system . The Clan Mechanism requires the “ norm of reciprocity ” and an idea of legitimate authority . From ( Emmanuel 1991 ), we add , “ but also social agreement
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on a broad range of values and beliefs . Because the Clan lacks the explicit price mechanism of the market and the explicit rules of the bureaucracy , it relies for its control upon a deep level of common agreement between members on what constitutes proper behaviour , and it requires a high level of commitment on the part of each individual to those socially prescribed behaviours . The ‘ Guardian ’ would need some collective action with the system participants .
The Clan Mechanism of Control is well suited to relatively small networks or clusters of small networks , according to ( Stafsudd 2009 ), who says , “ it is proposed that informal governance mechanisms , such as social control in the form of norms together with highly clustered networks , may provide a complement to formal governance mechanisms , such as laws , in providing investor protection .” She also seems to support the assertion first made by ( Ouchi 1979 ) that the Clan Mechanism of Control can be superimposed on other control mechanisms since the elements of Ouchi ’ s market mechanism are contained in the bureaucratic mechanism , which is in turn included in the clan mech-
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