Figure 5: Arch-rivals Boeing 737 Max (above) and Airbus A320 Neo (below)
new fuel-efficient A320 Neo. Boeing rushed to
bring their 737 new generation model called 737
Max into market as quickly as possible to compete
with the A320 Neo. In developing the 737 Max,
Boeing started cutting corners. Since the 737 Max
was the same plane type as its predecessors, it
was assumed that pilots would only need a 2.5-
hour iPad training to fly its newest iteration.
Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation
System (MCAS) is the new system blamed for
the crashes. But its failure in both cases was the
result of Boeing and FAA reluctance to properly
inform pilots of its existence or to regulate it for
safety. The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) has
admitted to being incompetent while regulating
the MCAS software. Nowhere in its amended
type certification of 737 Max is MCAS mentioned.
However, Boeing still only recommends a
30-minute self-study for pilots on MCAS, rather
than additional simulator or classroom instruction.
Despite the two crashes, neither Boeing nor the
FAA believes they have done anything wrong. A
Boeing spokesperson said the company believes
the system is still “a robust and effective way for
the FAA to execute its oversight of safety”.
Figure 6: Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max
incident
Finally, ‘Human Fac tor s’ awarene s s
programmes and implementation can lead to the
improved quality of an environment that ensures
continuing employee and aircraft safety. More
specifically, the reduction of even minor errors
can provide measurable benefits including cost
reduction, less work-related injuries and fewer
errors during aircraft maintenance and operations.
Failure to comply with even the simple elements of
‘Human Factors’ can lead to huge disasters that
cost lives.
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