Indian Politics & Policy Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 2020 | Page 26

Indian Politics & Policy
The dependent variable is whether the
respondent voted for the BJP (coded
as 1) or not (coded as 0). Note that I
dropped all responses that are undisclosed,
a vote for an NDA coalition
partner (other than the BJP), or those
who did not vote. In this model, I retained
Econ.Impr and Econ.Wors and
BJP party attachment. I also included
other variables known to have an impact
on the BJP vote. These include
caste-community identity, gender, rural,
and economic class. The results are
presented in Figure 3.
I find that as with the previous
model’s positive and negative evaluations,
Econ.Impr and Econ.Wors have
expected signs and are statistically significant.
Positive evaluations of the
economy increase the likelihood of a
BJP vote by approximately 6 percent
and a negative evaluation lowers the
likelihood of a BJP vote by about 14
percent (relative to those who do not
perceive a change in their household
economic conditions). Consistent with
prior results, 20 party attachment exerts a
strong and statistically significant effect
on the BJP vote. That is, voters expressing
an attachment toward the BJP are
approximately 60 percent more likely
to vote for the BJP than those who not
express an attachment to the BJP. Similarly,
I also find that the coefficients for
all Hindu caste groups are positive (i.e.,
fall to the right of the vertical dashed
line) and statistically significant. All
Hindu caste groups—Dalits, Adivasi,
OBC, and upper caste—are more likely
to vote for the BJP compared to Other
religious communities that identify as
upper castes (the reference category).
All caste-community groups identified
as both religious and caste minorities
(for instance, Muslim Dalit, Sikh Dalit,
Christian Adivasi, and so on) are
less likely to vote for the BJP compared
to other upper castes, since the coefficients
are negative and statistically
significant. Hindu upper castes are 32
percent more likely to vote for the BJP
compared to other upper castes. Similarly,
Hindu Adivasi and Hindu OBC
are approximately 20 percent, and Hindu
Dalits about 12 percent more likely
to vote for the BJP compared to other
upper castes. Among Muslims, caste
minorities are 21 percent less likely to
cast a vote for the BJP. Similarly, Muslim
OBCs and Muslims identifying as
belonging to other castes are about 30
percent less likely to do so. The pattern
among Christian caste groups is the
same as among Muslims. Christian minorities
and others are approximately
15 and 25 percent less likely to vote for
the BJP. Rural voters are 5 percent more
likely to vote for the BJP compared to
urban voters. Once again, consistent
with prior studies, 21 I find that the poor
are about 7 percent more likely to vote
for the BJP as compared to those identified
as the upper class. The lower and
middle classes are not statistically different
from the rich in this regard. I
don’t find any statistical difference in
the likelihood of a BJP vote across men
and women. 22
Do positive or negative household
economic evaluations influence
vote choice, or does vote choice influence
how a voter perceives household
economic conditions? A growing body
of work has addressed the endogenous
22