Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2018 | Page 18

Tone Shift: India’s Dominant Foreign Policy Aims Under Modi
BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles,
and signed agreements on coast guard
cooperation. Underpinned by continued
and deepening economic exchanges,
these are all significant and now
entrenched upgrades to India’s foreign
policy. In turn, the ASEAN-India Free
Trade Area entered into force in July
2015, which provided further foundation
for the proactive diplomacy that
hallmarked the Act East policy.
Augmenting other particular
bilateral relations has also been crucial
to the Act East policy, in much the
same way as amplifying US relations
has underpinned gaining great power
status, and intensified Russia and China
ties have typified the realization of
a multipolar world order. Thus, within
the Indo-Pacific region, “Modi has
sought to significantly boost ties with
Japan ... (which) is a break from his
predecessors.” 83 Modi’s 2014 visit to
Japan was his first outside South Asia
and witnessed bilateral relations being
immediately elevated to that of a “Special
Strategic and Global Partnership.”
Confirming these linkages, and Modi
and Shinzo Abe’s ardent nationalism,
the leaders “decided to create a relationship
that will shape the course of
their countries and the character of
this region and the world in this century.”
84 Abe’s 2015 visit to India saw the
announcement of the “Vision 2025”
statement “which reflects a broad convergence
of their long-term political,
economic, and strategic goals” 85 and
centered upon purported political
congruence concerning pluralism, tolerance,
the rule of law, and democracy.
Such a convergence of domestic values
and identities—both mainstays of constructivism—reiterated
the closeness
of their relations and their importance
concerning enacting the Act East policy.
Further exemplifying these narratives,
India invited Japan to become a
permanent participant in the India-US
Malabar naval exercises, which Tokyo
took up in 2016, and pointed to
a deepening triadic relationship between
these states. The addition of an
explicit security dimension to India–
Japan relations also epitomized a noteworthy
step change in relations that
stressed mutual “stability and prosperity,
... (and) reiterated the need to
further consolidate their security and
defence cooperation.” 86 Adherence
to “working jointly for strengthening
(a) rules-based international order in
the Indo-Pacific region and beyond” 87
further confirmed such shared aims,
and additionally formed part of New
Delhi’s emergent coalition-building
strategy. This heightening political and
strategic convergence continued to be
underpinned by deeper economic ties,
for example the signing of a deal for Japan
to build a bullet train from Mumbai
to Ahmedabad, and which further
emphasized the frequency and repetition
of closer India-Japan ties within
Indian foreign policy discourses.
Further afield, such tendencies
within Modi’s foreign policy have been
confirmed in relations with Australia,
ties which ameliorated the desired
enactment of the Act East policy and
wider strategic linkages with the United
States and Japan. The first Indian
prime minister to visit Australia since
1987, Modi’s 2014 mission recognized
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