Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2018 | Page 16

Tone Shift: India’s Dominant Foreign Policy Aims Under Modi
jor powers in the region and the world,
offers a momentous opportunity for
(the) realisation of the Asian Century.” 65
These common aims have thus further
enhanced the normative presence and
importance of the strategic preference
for a multipolar world order.
Although this rhetoric in many
ways mimics that of previous UPA
governments, at the core of Modi’s approach
is the new belief that positive
gains can only be achieved through a
“dogged and open style of assertive diplomacy.”
66 Thus, while major trade and
investment gains were realized during
the visit of Xi Jinping to India in 2014,
Prime Minister Modi emphasized that
“‘there should be peace in our relations
and in the borders. If this happens, we
can realise (the) true potential of our
relations’.” 67 As such, the new NDA has
been more forceful in its use of India’s
military capabilities, especially along
the Himalayan border 68 and also enacting
stronger responses concerning any
incursions by Chinese troops (which
have occurred on several occasions). Indian
officials have also publically vowed
that Arunachal Pradesh (which the two
sides dispute) is an inalienable part of
India, and to which the Indian Home
Minister openly visited in 2015. As part
of this strategy, and as already evidenced
above concerning Indo-US ties, “to an
unprecedented degree, India is openly
embarking on coalition-building ... as
a way of strengthening its bargaining
position” 69 versus Beijing, and which
has so far involved Vietnam, Japan, and
Australia. In turn, New Delhi refused to
be part of China “One Belt, One Road”
initiative, arguing that it had not been
sufficiently consulted but also because
the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) runs through the disputed
Kashmir region. Collectively, these developments
represent “a qualitative shift
in relations with the PRC,” 70 and show
a marked change from the previous 10
years of India-China interactions under
the UPA whereby the tone of Indian diplomacy
has now changed.
The final strand of the strategy
to achieve multipolarity is institutional,
whereby India “has discovered ‘exclusive
multilateralism’” 71 as a fruitful diplomatic
endeavor. So enhanced are New
Delhi’s efforts in this domain that scholars
have argued that “Modi’s leadership
may be just as important in enhancing
India’s willingness to take on the role
of an international leader as it seems
to be in improving India’s ability to do
so” 72 —again underlining the veracity of
the BJP’s assertive and pragmatic public
diplomacy, and the evidence of their
specific political values and identity (as
per constructivism) influencing the
conduct of Indian foreign policy. India’s
involvement in helping set up the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank in October
2014, as well as the New Development
Bank in July 2014, points to this
new-found self-confidence. Overarching
these efforts, in 2017 India became a
full member of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, which Modi deemed
to be “a logical extension India’s age
old ties with the region; ... India’s engagement
... will help us build a region
which is an engine of economic growth
for the world; (and) is more stable.” 73
These efforts point to an international
system that is in flux and how India is
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