Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2018 | Page 12

Tone Shift: India’s Dominant Foreign Policy Aims Under Modi
of the state’s self-sufficiency in international
affairs. Within this thinking, the
concept of India’s “strategic autonomy”
has gained greater prominence in official
discourses whereby it “undergird(s)
its quest for security and status.” 33 Realizing
such autonomy rests upon accumulating
sufficient amounts of power
for India “to articulate its own interests
in foreign policy and in the shaping of
the world order,” 34 which marks continuity
from a long-held preference for
self-reliance. Underpinning these global
ambitions is a sense that India is a
state that “cannot be ignored ... (and)
one whose relative weight and influence
in material terms have been increasing
over the past decade.” 35 Predominant
to such narratives is increasing India’s
position as a large developing economy
that can be of potential benefit to
the current global economic order, and
strengthening “Brand India” as a means
to enhance her domestic modernization
programme. Integral to such linkages,
and in conjunction with ensuring
energy and trade security, is cultivating
defense and multilateral capabilities
that embolden the self-realization of its
strategic autonomy. An ever-greater appreciation
of India as a “swing state” of
value to a host of major states—such as
the United States and Japan—has also
helped to boost this tactical aim.
Harking back to the clear
pro-capitalist tendencies typifying the
BJP’s economic approach, “Modi’s government
has adopted a more pro-business
stance than its predecessor.” 36 Reflecting
how many voters’ concerns in
the 2014 election related to the economy,
India’s modernizing, globalizing,
and media-dominated middle class remains
a core constituency for the BJP.
Modi has henceforth “repeatedly emphasized
the goal of promoting growth
and employment generation as the fundamental
criterion for a successful foreign
policy.” 37 This focus has led to a slew
of innovations such as “Make in India,”
“Skill India,” “Digital India,” and “Start
Up India,” all of which are intended to
boost foreign direct investment, create
jobs, enhance workforce skills, and
increase production standards. Broadening
the bandwidth of India’s international
diplomacy, via an ever-widening
multi-directional diplomatic strategy,
illustrates this aim as New Delhi seeks
new trade and energy partners across
Asia, Africa, and South America. These
ties have included enhanced Saudi Arabia
relations, as well as major investment
pledges worth $35 billion and $22
billion from Japan and China, respectively.
38 Modi’s creation of “a web of allies
to mutually further our [India’s] interests”
39 has galvanized these interests,
and has further entrenched the norm of
gaining great power recognition.
Apart from displaying clear—
and accelerating—continuities from
the first NDA and the 2004–14 UPA
regimes concerning enhancing India’s
great power status through expanding
self-sufficiency and greater economic
capabilities, NDA II has maintained,
reinvigorated, and deepened relations
with the United States. As an established
great power, Washington crucially
acts as a gatekeeper, sponsor, and
endorser of emergent great powers, 40
and is thus central to the attainment of
India’s status aspirations in the current
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