IIC Journal of Innovation 9th Edition | Page 62

Assuring Trustworthiness via Structured Assurance Cases legitimate update without that signed checksum. Once they had access to the CAN bus from the head-unit they could issue all the commands they wanted to the others on the bus, including opening windows, closing the window, changing speeds, turning the wheels, turning on the blinkers and windshield wipers and so on. inherent weakness could have identified the mistakes leveraged by the Jeep hacks. Expecting engineers and developers to think of the myriad of ways software can be influenced and attacked to do things that were not intended by its creators without standard methods of identifying what to look for and proving a rigorous method for collecting and analyzing what is done is one of the most common mistakes enterprises make. Through knowledge-bases such as CVE, CWE, and CAPEC, an organization can leverage the expertise of the world’s software security and assurance experts and apply it into their specific type of software- enabled capabilities. All of the different testing techniques introduced and discussed in this section can be brought together as part of the evidence supporting an assurance case. Now the actual attacks in 2015 did not work at highway speed, because it was based on a hack to the diagnostic system that does not allow changes to be made above 5 MPH, but it turned out that the tire pressure monitoring system was the source of the information about what speed the vehicle was going. So, in 2016, the Jeep Hack was evolved to spoof the tire pressure monitor messages to tell the car that it was going slow when it really wasn't. This was possible because the protocol for the bus discarded duplicate messages. Once they figured out how to get illegitimate message and message numbers onto the bus before the actual tire pressure monitoring systems messages through a spoof attack, they could go at highway speeds. Now when the tire pressure management system put its message out, it was discarded as duplicative and the car paid attention to the spoofed messages that it was going slow when in fact it was not. The DEIS (dependability engineering, innovation for cyber physical systems) project 35 is one example of an effort applying assurance cases. DEIS is exploring the idea of a digital dependability identity, which basically has all the information about the dependability characteristics of the cyber physical system. We offer that you can swap the word trustworthiness for dependability. Thus, the idea they are investigating is to have the vehicle itself, from its creation on, carry in digital form, the assurance case for why it is trustworthy and under what conditions it is trustworthy. Then, as it goes out into the world it can offer up to others in its ecosystem an explicit machine process-able document that A more structured review of the possible weaknesses in the design, architecture, code and deployed configurations of the software-enabled capabilities in the Jeep ecosystem, guided by a broad understanding of how software can be attacked through its 35 Dependability Engineering Innovation for Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), http://www.deis-project.eu/ September 2018 - 58 -