IIC Journal of Innovation 9th Edition | Page 23

Trustworthiness in Industrial System Design Pool of Trustworthiness Methods brought back to normal. For example, an airplane engine flame-out situation ges would cause the captain to react by bringing the airplane to a lower Security Normal succeed altitude so he can try a windmill Safety “works” Restart. After that maneuver the pilot cha llen ge needs to check the entire system, e.g., suc cee s Reliability d Disruption fail to find out why the engine flamed out, Privacy bring the airplane back to the original altitude and declare the problem as System Stabilizing Defending status methods methods solved, and thus change the status back to normal. Figure 6 demonstrates Figure 5: Trustworthiness in normal system status receiving incidents this case: The pilot’s action to bring the airplane to a lower altitude is a A threat in general is not a problem in and of Trustworthiness Safety Method, reaching a itself. For example, every electric motor has safe status of disrupted. The Windmill the principle threat of overheating and every Restart is a Trustworthiness Resilience internet access the threat of a hacker attack. But only if the threat actually reaches the Pool of targets Trustworthiness Threat system Incident system, is it relevant. In this case the threat Methods cha created an incident, as shown in Figure 5. llen ges Now Trustworthiness Mechanisms which are Security Normal assigned to security and/or safety are trying succeed Safety “works” to reject this incident. For example, a safety ch a method reduces the speed of the lle suc nges overheated motor so it can cool down. Or cee Reliability Disruption d fail Privacy the firewall in the router blocks the hacker s ge n e attack as a security method. If protection is ll ha c successful, the system status returns back to Security Disrupted succeed Safety “problems” normal. If the threat cannot be prevented – ch a either because the Trustworthiness lle suc nges Mechanisms are not working as expected or cee Resilience d fail Damage an oversight by design failure – the system status switches from normal to disrupted. Threat targets system Incident cha llen System status Disrupted Systems A disrupted system is not necessarily a big problem. The Trustworthy System Status just defines this as a condition that the system is outside the normal status and needs some individual handling to be Stabilizing methods Defending methods Figure 6: Trustworthiness in normal and disrupted system status Method. If one of these methods fails, the disrupted status cannot be continued, and the system status moves to damaged (because now one of the engines cannot be - 19 - IIC Journal of Innovation