iGaming Business magazine iGB 112 Sept/Oct 2018 | Page 116

Finance Chart 1: RP iGaming 35 stock index 6,800 Index NASDAQ (RHS) 31 0 August 7,000 20 7,200 40 7,400 60 7,600 80 7,800 100 8,000 120 8,200 140 Index-WMH Chart 2: Top 15 components by Index share (31 August 2018) 6.8% 1.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 2.6% 21.1% 3.3% 2.9% 4.2% 16.2% 6.6% 7.5% 11.6% 7.7% Stars Group Paddy Power Betfair Churchill Downs Playtech GVC 888 Holdings NetEnt Kindred Group William Hill Jackpotjoy Evolution Gaming Betsson Bet-at-home Tabcorp Kambi Other Chart 3: Top 10 Index components (11 May-31 August 2018) 11,000 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 Stars Group 888 Holdings GVC iGamingBusiness | Issue 112 | September/October 2018 Betsson Evolution Gaming Tabcorp Kindred Group William Hill Paddy Power Betfair Churchill Downs 112 0 gains (the leverage being an important component of stock volatility – in both directions). The index largely held onto these gains during the pre-Q2 reporting period, buoyed by US newsflow (with plenty of hyperbole), the hope of a strong World Cup performance for exposed stocks and relatively strong underlying market conditions. Indeed, the index reached its peak for this period in the week of 20 July – just before the Q2 reporting season began (and several weeks after Playtech’s profit warning). Most companies reported broadly in-line Q3 results, but most were aggressively sold off regardless (see Chart 2). It should be noted that this was a largely gambling-specific phenomenon – our benchmark has continued to make steady gains while the RP iGaming index sank to ‘pre momentous’ levels and has yet to recover. The index is currently trading 3% off its start and fully 13% off its July highs. We believe there are four reasons for this, though we caution that seeking reason in short-term price movements is often a fool’s errand. First is a condition that has been present in gambling for as long as the sector has been popular with investors: reality is rarely as exciting as the promise. This is particularly an issue with a period driven initially by M&A, World Cup and US hopes. While there has certainly been some of the former (PPB-FanDuel, for example), the big companies have not yet been the target. Equally, for all the hype around the World Cup, it is at best only about 5% of a typical European sportsbook’s revenue – material, and a big swing factor in the summer, but easily lost in the noise. Equally, while PASPA might be exciting in the long term, initial results inevitably reflect the costs long before the rewards. Second, we are seeing a material shift in growth patterns which is not helpful for listed companies. Online growth is still strong in southern Europe, as demonstrated by official figures in Spain and Italy. Restricted markets are also seeing mass market boosts with catalysts – see France and Portugal. It is also possible that Asia is growing strongly (except for Playtech), though this is opaque. The problem is that listed companies have very little, if any, exposure to these markets because they are small and/or their leading operators are private. Instead, listed companies are heavily weighted to the UK and Nordics, where growth has become a lot more challenging since last year (not for all, but certainly for a critical mass of exposed stocks). The problem with single-digit underlying growth is that even a high margin World Cup cannot make it exciting relative to the risks. The third reason is regulation, of course. The FOBT issue in the UK might have been decided, but the regulatory heat has shi