blundered , of the rusty machinery inside the dangerous artifact . However , they do not want to be like the older cadres and executives . What they really want for their future is a body of laws that justifies , as personal fortune , the wealth amassed or intended to be amassed in virtue of the advantages provided by their respective public offices . They are preceded by the few elders who made the first interventions in the national wealth . Now the old guard entrenched itself without allowing the massive access of new members ( as spare parts ) in the exclusive club empowered to get juicy benefits from the public good . The old guard knows that , in the medium term , such an access would mean to void — for most of the population — the old Maoist maxim guiding all the recent changes : " The people who are no longer poor , cease to be revolutionaries ." Meanwhile , the foundations of a real and concrete support ( the vampirised Venezuela , the remittances from Miami , the juicy collection from the slave labor of health care personnel abroad , the drain of travelers and goods by custom officers ), as well as the imaginary sources of miraculous survival ( e . g ., the Mariel port , sold as a megaproject for saving the nation , but still without reaching the US ), are weakened under the pressure of a devastating reality : a base of credibility and sustainment so flimsy , that it can go to hell in a very short term . Even accepting that the old guard will still manage itself to retain power , Cuba would be in such a precarious situation that the circle of protégés and privileges — to which these young cadres are attached — will be furtherly reduced . And the young cadres do not want that , because their fragile chances of getting a little more privileges would be vanished , along with their public offices , always under risk of repression , as a result of the customary rampant dispossession and the political ostracism that some old stars of the Castroite firmament enjoy today , like two foreign ministers ( Felipe Perez Roque and Roberto Robaina ), two Carlitos ( Lage and Aldana ), and a long etcetera . Despite all this , the agitated and eager privileged few who execute orders from above do not dare to mobilize the people to decidedly replace the stubborn owner of the country . They are not paving the way to a new conception of the State , already openly capitalist in the economy , by becoming the first successors in getting the hands in the public area , as the Sandinistas did in Nicaragua and the Party chieftains and former KGB officers did in Russia . Thusly they could legally ensure their assets , but since they are chicks fed by the totalitarian bottle , not democratic cadres at all , they are also paralyzed by a terrifying image : if the whole system collapses or suddenly changes , the victors will be settling the score against them or they must begin to compete against new inductees under new rules beyond the golden standard of being a mere unconditional halberdier . Such a fear is multiplied by the chilling historiography that we are suffering because of perennial reminders by the Castroist propaganda machine : the fierce retaliation after the fall of Machado in 1933 , the terror unleashed by the new rulers in 1959 with indiscriminate executions , the threat of a returning and vindictive exile ... Overwhelmed by all that , the younger cadres forget other fearsome national conflicts that , however , were solved without retaliation or bloody collection of debt , as Cubans and Spaniards did during the transition from colony to republic . There is a more contemporary example . Occasional or permanent Castroite repressors have managed themselves to benefit from the so-called Cuban Adjustment in USA . Now they are neighbors of the exiles . How many
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