blundered, of the rusty machinery inside the dangerous artifact. However, they do not want to be like the older cadres and executives. What they really want for their future is a body of laws that justifies, as personal fortune, the wealth amassed or intended to be amassed in virtue of the advantages provided by their respective public offices. They are preceded by the few elders who made the first interventions in the national wealth. Now the old guard entrenched itself without allowing the massive access of new members( as spare parts) in the exclusive club empowered to get juicy benefits from the public good. The old guard knows that, in the medium term, such an access would mean to void— for most of the population— the old Maoist maxim guiding all the recent changes: " The people who are no longer poor, cease to be revolutionaries." Meanwhile, the foundations of a real and concrete support( the vampirised Venezuela, the remittances from Miami, the juicy collection from the slave labor of health care personnel abroad, the drain of travelers and goods by custom officers), as well as the imaginary sources of miraculous survival( e. g., the Mariel port, sold as a megaproject for saving the nation, but still without reaching the US), are weakened under the pressure of a devastating reality: a base of credibility and sustainment so flimsy, that it can go to hell in a very short term. Even accepting that the old guard will still manage itself to retain power, Cuba would be in such a precarious situation that the circle of protégés and privileges— to which these young cadres are attached— will be furtherly reduced. And the young cadres do not want that, because their fragile chances of getting a little more privileges would be vanished, along with their public offices, always under risk of repression, as a result of the customary rampant dispossession and the political ostracism that some old stars of the Castroite firmament enjoy today, like two foreign ministers( Felipe Perez Roque and Roberto Robaina), two Carlitos( Lage and Aldana), and a long etcetera. Despite all this, the agitated and eager privileged few who execute orders from above do not dare to mobilize the people to decidedly replace the stubborn owner of the country. They are not paving the way to a new conception of the State, already openly capitalist in the economy, by becoming the first successors in getting the hands in the public area, as the Sandinistas did in Nicaragua and the Party chieftains and former KGB officers did in Russia. Thusly they could legally ensure their assets, but since they are chicks fed by the totalitarian bottle, not democratic cadres at all, they are also paralyzed by a terrifying image: if the whole system collapses or suddenly changes, the victors will be settling the score against them or they must begin to compete against new inductees under new rules beyond the golden standard of being a mere unconditional halberdier. Such a fear is multiplied by the chilling historiography that we are suffering because of perennial reminders by the Castroist propaganda machine: the fierce retaliation after the fall of Machado in 1933, the terror unleashed by the new rulers in 1959 with indiscriminate executions, the threat of a returning and vindictive exile... Overwhelmed by all that, the younger cadres forget other fearsome national conflicts that, however, were solved without retaliation or bloody collection of debt, as Cubans and Spaniards did during the transition from colony to republic. There is a more contemporary example. Occasional or permanent Castroite repressors have managed themselves to benefit from the so-called Cuban Adjustment in USA. Now they are neighbors of the exiles. How many
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