IDENTIDADES 1 ENGLISH IDENTIDADES 8 ENGLISH | Page 153

The analysis and enlightenment of this contradiction would have significant consequences for the entire process of rebuilding the State and implementing reforms of the constitution and the other laws. How is it possible that Cuban citizens can exercise power directly and have neither legal powers nor recognized mechanisms to reform the constitution, which is an expression of their sovereign power? From here it is possible to bring forward the concept of invented space as a direct exercise of the sovereign power. A second argument reads thus: if we see the constitution as a tree of logical branches, where its articles follow certain sequence for generating power and rights, then Article 137 closes and shields a state power that is not defined in any of the preceding articles on the source of legitimacy and popular sovereignty. The constitutional shielding of the State does not stemmed from the sovereignty in the constitutional order. All the constitutional shields are mounted further on without logical connection to the sovereignty, but rather to limit it and to deny it. Thusly this article is unconstitutional since it takes certain distance from the exercise of sovereignty. The latter can be exercised not only directly, but also by proxy. Indeed, the deputies elected by the people to the National Assembly cannot represent the ideas of the people on changing a system that supposedly was born from the mandate of the people. The dilemma of the political actors These approaches to the articles that provides shielding to the State are basic for a constitutional amendment, whether total or partial. However, the Cuban political dynamics brings into view a general dilemma for all political actors. Such a dilemma emerges from the standard praxis and the historical path of evolution or change, running from the facts to the law, from the political reality to the constitutional and legal structures. This development is interesting and reflects three key issues of the Cuban state in historical context. The political will and actions were never built on the basis offered by the bureaucratic institutions and the very constitution. The state practices were marked by the needs of government and founded on a self-styled and untouchable Revolution as source of law. Without institutions there was neither a yardstick for measuring the effectiveness of the public policies nor a way to establish accountability, legality, and action areas. The state simply acted and turned more complicated the dynamics in all the spheres of social life. In the destructive contrast between the "spontaneous" actions of the regime and the reality, the political practices are undertaken as a matter of fact, not of law. Thus politics inevitably leads to urgencies instead of a series of acts required by law and to be contrasted with the law. That’s the way of acting by the time of political deadlock and it’s actually way to start a political opening: the usual practice —not the law— as the main criterion for action. The constitution is divorced from social reality. Nobody can comply with its articles to have a social, economic, and cultural life. An essential political fact explains the dynamics of revolution and power in the last 56 years: the State tolerates marginal illegality as an instrument of survival of all social actors. The social cost is the sacrifice of the institutional order, but it also fuels the need to adjust both the institutions and the constitution to the reality in our country. 153