IDENTIDADES 1 ENGLISH IDENTIDADES 7 ENGLISH | Page 116

second argument involves us seeing the Constitution as a tree with logical branches, its articulations corresponding to an order that generates power and rights. Thus, Article 137 closes and limits a State power that is not defined in any of the Constitution’s Articles that precede Article 3 as defining the source of popular legitimacy and sovereignty. None of the elements and principles with which the Cuban State constitutionally protects itself precedes sovereignty in the Constitution’s formulation. They succeed it but are not logically deduced from it, only to limit and deny it. Thus, Article 137 is unconstitutional both in and by principle, because it distances itself from the very exercise of sovereignty, not only the kind that can be exercised directly, but also from that which can be exercised through representation. Those elected by the people to represent them in the National Assembly cannot represent their ideas regarding change to a legal system that is supposed to be born by popular mandate. These musings on the protective articles are basic for a constitutional reform, whether it is posited globally or a more specific manner. Nevertheless, seen through the lens of Cuban political dynamics, what emerges is a general dilemma for all the political actors who are marking their practices and legitimating the historic road or path for evolution or change from the acts to the law, from a political reality to the legal and constitutional framework. In historical and political terms, this evolution reflects three essen- tial issues having to do with the Cuban State’s legal system. First: in Cuba, political will and actions have never been constructed fundamentally on the base offered by bureaucratic institutions and even the Constitution. The State’s practices were marked by the government’s needs and integrated into a self-styled, unquestionable Revolution as the source of law. Without institutionalism, there was no way to measure the effectiveness of public policies or delimiting responsibilities, legality, and action areas. In this way, the State simply acted and complicated the dynamics in all spheres of social life. In the destructive contrast between the Regime’s “spontaneous” action and reality, the political practice employed represents deeds, not laws. Thus, politics inevitably leads to urgency and not to orderly acts contrasted with and throug