IDENTIDADES 1 ENGLISH IDENTIDADES 7 ENGLISH | Page 116
second argument involves us seeing the
Constitution as a tree with logical
branches, its articulations corresponding
to an order that generates power and
rights. Thus, Article 137 closes and limits a State power that is not defined in
any of the Constitution’s Articles that
precede Article 3 as defining the source
of popular legitimacy and sovereignty.
None of the elements and principles with
which the Cuban State constitutionally
protects itself precedes sovereignty in
the Constitution’s formulation. They
succeed it but are not logically deduced
from it, only to limit and deny it. Thus,
Article 137 is unconstitutional both in
and by principle, because it distances
itself from the very exercise of sovereignty, not only the kind that can be exercised directly, but also from that which
can be exercised through representation.
Those elected by the people to represent
them in the National Assembly cannot
represent their ideas regarding change to
a legal system that is supposed to be
born by popular mandate. These musings on the protective articles are basic
for a constitutional reform, whether it is
posited globally or a more specific manner. Nevertheless, seen through the lens
of Cuban political dynamics, what
emerges is a general dilemma for all the
political actors who are marking their
practices and legitimating the historic
road or path for evolution or change
from the acts to the law, from a political
reality to the legal and constitutional
framework. In historical and political
terms, this evolution reflects three essen-
tial issues having to do with the Cuban
State’s legal system.
First: in Cuba, political will and actions
have never been constructed fundamentally on the base offered by bureaucratic
institutions and even the Constitution.
The State’s practices were marked by the
government’s needs and integrated into a
self-styled, unquestionable Revolution as
the source of law. Without institutionalism, there was no way to measure the
effectiveness of public policies or delimiting responsibilities, legality, and action
areas. In this way, the State simply acted
and complicated the dynamics in all
spheres of social life. In the destructive
contrast between the Regime’s “spontaneous” action and reality, the political
practice employed represents deeds, not
laws. Thus, politics inevitably leads to
urgency and not to orderly acts contrasted with and throug