Eliza Parr - History
Abstract
This essay aims to answer the question: “to what extent did the Nazi
consolidation of power during 1933-1934 constitute a legal revolution?”
In addressing this issue, the nature of a revolution is considered before
the components of a legal revolution are identified as being to bring
about by legal and democratic means fundamental changes to the values
of a state similar to those that would have occurred through the use of
illegal force. The legal and constitutional framework within which Hitler’s
consolidation of power takes place is then considered, in order to form a
benchmark against which the legality of his actions can be measured.
The first half of the essay considers the apparently legal means
by which Hitler’s consolidation of power could be characterised as
constituting a legal revolution, in particular the adoption of the Enabling
Act, the creation of the Gestapo and the People’s Court. The views of
commentators supporting the suggestion that the consolidation of power
was legal, including A.J.P. Taylor and the positivist legal theorist H.L.A.
Hart, are evaluated. The constitutional validity of the Enabling Act is then
considered, before analysing whether Hitler’s actions can reasonably
be described as “legal” by reference to the key principles underlying
the Weimar Constitution. Contemporary sources from the Nuremberg
“Judges” Trial and the essays of a Jewish legal professor who fled from
the Nazi regime are reviewed, although the rulings of the Nuremberg
Trials are not examined extensively.
It is concluded that whilst Hitler’s consolidation of power was
revolutionary in its outcome as it overthrew the existing legal and
political systems, the seemingly legal acts and decrees which he used so
undermined the fundamental principles of the Weimar Constitution and
any generally accepted notion of “legality” that it cannot reasonably be
described as a legal revolution.
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