LONG AND
WINDING ROADS
makers in Washington believed, then,
together with development experts,
they could earn the support of local
Afghans by keeping them safe and
building a lasting economy and reliable
government institutions.
But something wasn’t working. Afghanistan remained as volatile as ever.
President Hamid Karzai’s government
was in disarray, the nascent Afghan
army and police force continued to
buckle under the weight of their responsibilities, and a resurgent Taliban
attacked seemingly at will.
Within Washington policy circles,
it had become clear that development
plans had not done their part to improve stability, but planners couldn’t
agree on what to change. Some thought
the projects had to get bigger and
bolder. Others, including many in the
U.S. military, believed the answer lay
in more discreet efforts — improving
water and electricity reliability, or empowering ground-level commanders to
dispense funds on smaller initiatives.
Through $25,000 “quick-impact projects,” like providing work for militaryaged males digging irrigation canals, the
thinking went, money could be deployed
“as a weapons system,” in the words of
one 2009 U.S. commanders manual.
Wilder led a small team of other researchers as they fanned out across the
country over several years, inspecting de-
HUFFINGTON
10.14.12
velopment projects in five provinces and
conducting long, one-on-one meetings
with tribal leaders. They looked at survey
responses and analyzed data from military and civilian officials on the ground.
It was “a debat H