Hong Kong Young Writers Anthologies Non-Fiction 2019 | Page 40

‘Chinese Dream’. However, such claims of soft power are very much suspect - and in contemporary China,
the new BRI and expansionist policies shrouds itself under the same pretensions.
It is claimed that the soft power appeal of Chinese traditionalism and ‘higher culture’ remains the
preeminent reason for voluntary tributary involvement. Indeed, claiming the voyages were acts of ‘cultural
expansion’, not military coercion - the modern narrative of the BRI remains similar, characterized as
mutually-benefiting economic expansion, rather than predatory schemes. This, however, remains a
disingenuous characterization. Proclamations were sent to foreign kings to either “submit” to the Ming
Empire or either risk potential overwhelming military force and “pacification” - a risk surely noted given
the over-militarization of Zheng He’s fleets. Moreover, tribute countries had to reaffirm the supremacy of
the Chinese Empire which exemplifies the inherently asymmetrical, non-egalitarian power structure
entailed in the system - bargaining power was constrained 11 . It was a truly hierarchical system, projected
from the tenets of Confucianism in regards to structures of ‘father and son’ and ‘filial respect’.
Zheng He was also known to “walk like a tiger” 12 and certainly did not stray away from necessary violence.
To exemplify, Zheng He waged a land war against the kingdom of Kotte on Ceylon Island (an area now
modern day Sri Lanka) for disobeying Ming authority. Moreover, he flouted his military force when local
officials threatened his fleet in Arabia and East Africa. As noted in Zheng He’s inscription in Liujia Harbour
(1431): “When we arrived at the foreign countries, barbarian kings who resisted transformation and were
not respectful we captured alive”. Of course, many conflicts were preempted due to the overwhelming
might of the armada - rulers were threatened into submission
It is indubitable that China did have soft power appeal, yet Beijing’s current narrative overlooks the nature
of Zheng He’s voyages and the preponderance of power asymmetry involved - a primary reason for
involvement in the tributary system as otherwise, it would have been unlikely - under free choice - for
countries to accept the sinocentric ideal of Chinese supremacy.
The Fall
Subsequent Ming rulers - after the death of the Yongle Emperor - retrospectively deemed such voyages to
be of prodigality and that they were cost-beneficially inefficacious. With redirected aims, such as the then-
ensuing land war between the Yongle Emperor and the Mongols - a war wherein naval supremacy was
largely redundant, the voyages were stopped. Interfactional disputes between pro-expansionist eunuchs and
the parsimonious Confucians resulted in the eventual dwindling of the former and the ascendency of the
latter - the notions of human welfare taking precedent over state profit and ‘expansion’ remained cardinal in
Confucian philosophy and the voyages were infractions of thereof. This was substantiated by reference to
admonitions stipulated in the Huang-Ming Zuxun (皇明祖訓), the dynastic foundations left by the
Hongwu Emperor for his descendants. Therein, Hongwu asserted the need for ‘austerity’ in practical
administration. Moreover he regretted the profligacy and “high and unnecessary expenses” 13 incurred
through the tribute system of his time. With lack of support from civil officials, treasure voyages ceased and
further attempts at reinitiation were precluded, eventually leading to the confiscation of Zheng He’s records
and the destruction of his treasure fleet. By extension, shipyards were shut down and ordinances were placed
delineating that no ships with over two masts were to be made. Crafts knowledge eventually faded, plunging
the naval pre-eminence of the hegemon into oblivion 14 . Further ordinances precluded trade with
‘foreigners’ - a turn to isolationism, with the tributary system breaking down thereafter. Economist Angus
Deaton 15 postulates that such ordinances were a reaction from the higher elites fearing the spread of
mercantilism and free trade, which threatened the centrality of China’s economic prowess. The “passive”
11
An interesting example would be through how leaders of tributary states could only refer to themselves
as ‘king’, with the title of ‘emperor’ remaining exclusively Chinese
12
As noted by a contemporary of Zheng He
13
Yen Ch'ung-chien. Ch'u-yü chou-chih lu, Vol. III, ch. 8, 25. National Palace Museum (Peiping), 1930.
Op. cit. in Chang, 1974.
14
At its peak, the Ming Empire had 3500 ships - a truly astounding number (considering the United States
at present only has 324 # ). Moreover, US Navy will not reach 355 ships until 2050 asserts Rear Adm. Brian
Luther, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget.
15
Nobel Prize-winning Princeton economist, "The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of
Inequality,"