Healthcare Hygiene magazine April 2020 | Page 21

societal response. But governments and civil society are not heeding these warnings, as the 2019-nCoV attests. What we need to learn and communicate is that the zoonotic or agricultural bridging of novel pathogens from domestic and captive wildlife needs urgent attention, along with attention to the human appetite for meat. This approach is easily achieved for coronavirus threats—e.g., by substantially reducing the trade of risky species of wild-caught animals for food or other purposes, and a culturally sensitive ban on the sale of these animals in wet markets. Vaccines and therapeutic alternatives might be possible and are needed, but they are a response, because the emerging strain is unpredictable and a vaccine is unlikely to prevent the initial events. In some parts of Africa, prevention of Ebola virus and future coronavirus threats require shifts in food habits, a transition from bushmeat being a cultural norm or primary source of protein, and by discouraging agricultural development that brings bats into increased contact with humans or livestock. In the Middle East, re-evaluating and improving infection prevention and control measures for camel farms, a recent introduction coincident with the emergence of MERS-CoV, would be a positive step forward.” Even as COVID-19 continues to test the readiness and preparedness of U.S. healthcare systems, we have had enough brushes with pandemics in the last century to not be surprised by the emergence of the novel coronavirus causing the current COVID-19 outbreak. As Pan, et al. (2020) remind us, “Human history is littered with wars and pandemics, but the death and fear caused by some pandemics cannot be matched by any war. The one with the largest number of deaths in recent human history, the Spanish flu caused by the H1N1 influenza A virus, had infected 500 million people (almost one-third of the world population in 1918) and killed 25 million to 50 million people. In the 21st century, human epidemics caused by viruses have continuously appeared in the public eye. Among them, the new infectious diseases caused by wild animal coronavirus infections in humans have attracted the most attention, reminding us that people should be fully prepared to respond to a larger pandemic that may occur at any time in the future.” As Pan, et al. (2020) continues, “The rapid increase in the number of 2019-nCoV cases in a short period of time has forced society to respond quickly. At present, 2019-nCOV is still spreading rapidly, and the origin of the new virus, transmission modes other than saliva droplets and airborne transmission, the window period, the contagious period after clinical recovery, and patient prognosis are unknown – but the efforts of all parties have begun to bear fruit.” At the time of writing, researchers are working on vaccines and other therapeutics to address COVID-19. The emergence and rapid increase in cases of COVID-19 poses complex challenges to the global public health, research and medical communities, write federal scientists from NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Their commentary appears in The New England Journal of Medicine. NIAID director Anthony S. Fauci, MD, NIAID deputy director for clinical research and special projects; H. Clifford www.healthcarehygienemagazine.com • april 2020 Lane, MD, and CDC director Robert R. What we need Redfield, MD, shared their observations in the context of a recently published to learn and report on the early transmission dynam- communicate is ics of COVID-19. The report provided that the zoonotic or detailed clinical and epidemiological information about the first 425 cases to agricultural bridging arise in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. of novel pathogens Fauci, Lane and Redfield point to the many research efforts now underway from domestic and to address COVID-19. These include captive wildlife needs numerous vaccine candidates proceed- ing toward early-stage clinical trials as urgent attention, well as clinical trials already underway along with attention to test candidate therapeutics, includ- ing an NIAID-sponsored trial of the to the human appetite experimental antiviral drug remdesivir for meat.” that began enrolling participants on Feb. 21, 2020. “The COVID-19 outbreak is a stark reminder of the ongoing challenge of emerging and re-emerging infectious pathogens and the need for constant surveillance, prompt diagnosis and robust research to understand the basic biology of new organisms and our susceptibilities to them, as well as to develop effective countermeasures,” the authors observe. Infection Control Measures in the Early Fight Against COVID-19 Appropriate hospital infection control measures could prevent nosocomial transmission of COVID-19, experts say. Cheng, et al. (2020) sought to describe the infection control preparedness for COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 in the first 42 days after announcement of a cluster of pneumonia in China, on Dec. 31, 2019 (day 1) in Hong Kong. The researchers implemented a bundle approach of active and enhanced laboratory surveillance, early airborne infection isolation, rapid molecular diagnostic testing, and contact tracing for healthcare workers (HCWs) with unprotected exposure in the hospitals. Epidemiological characteristics of confirmed cases, environmental and air samples were collected and analyzed. Cheng, et al. (2020) report that from day 1 to day 42, 42 (3.3 percent) of 1,275 patients fulfilling active (n=29) and enhanced laboratory surveillance (n=13) confirmed to have SARS-CoV-2 infection. The number of locally acquired case significantly increased from 1 (7.7 percent) of 13 [day 22 to day 32] to 27 (93.1 percent) of 29 confirmed case [day 33 to day 42] (p<0.001). Twenty-eight patients (66.6 percent) came from eight family clusters. Eleven (2.7 percent) of 413 healthcare workers caring these confirmed cases were found to have unprotected exposure requiring quarantine for 14 days. None of them was infected and nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 was not observed. Environmental surveillance performed in a patient with viral load of 3.3x106 copies/ml (pooled nasopharyngeal/ throat swab) and 5.9x106 copies/ml (saliva) respectively. SARS-CoV-2 revealed in 1 (7.7 percent) of 13 environmental samples, but not in eight air samples collected at a distance of 10 cm from patient’s chin with or without wearing a surgical mask. As the researchers observe, “The emergence of novel coronavirus associated pneumonia posed a global threat 21