Policy
a fire consuming a London tower block. The fire was subject to an enquiry similarly to Grenfell, an inquiry that led to the coroner to urge the government to simplify and update fire safety guidance in 2013. Although the government acknowledged the tragedy of the Lakanal House fire, this tightening of fire safety standards failed to materialise in any meaningful terms.
Grenfell and its aftermath
The tragedy of the Grenfell fire is well known, and the echoes of that tragedy are still felt today. 72 people lost their lives in a catastrophic blaze, as flammable cladding panels turned a single flame into an inferno. These deaths were preventable, and it was the government and construction industry’ s lack of oversight that led to such a loss. In the words of Sir Martin Moore-Bick( chair of the Grenfell Public Inquiry), the disaster resulted from“ decades of failure by the UK central government and the construction industry to understand and act on the dangers of incorporating combustible materials into external walls of high-rise buildings.”
The fire rightly ushered in an urgent reformation of building safety in Britain. interim changes included a ban on combustible cladding for all high-rise buildings, which was implemented by 2018, as well as guidance in Approved Document B also being strengthened for buildings between 11 and 18 meters, whilst a number of inquiries and evaluations worked to understand the root cause and negligence that led to the tragedy. In May 2018, Dame Judith Hackitt’ s report“ Building a Safer Future” was published, concluding that the entire regulatory system for building safety was“ not fit for purpose.” Hackitt identified a culture of complacency and confusion: unclear responsibilities, inadequate competency among practitioners, and a lack of effective sanctions for non-compliance.
Hackitt called for a new framework of accountability spanning the whole building life cycle. Key recommendations included establishing a new statutory regulator for building safety, creating a more robust dutyholder regime( mirroring the approach of Construction Design & Management regulations) to assign clear responsibility at each project stage, and adopting a risk-based approach that would initially target high-risk residential buildings. These recommendations went on to influence the sweeping number of reforms that would be made in their wake.
The BSR is a cornerstone of this new regulatory landscape. The BSR became formally active in 2023 and represents a new institutional approach to governing building safety. According to the HSE, the BSR’ s purpose is threefold:( 1) to regulate higherrisk buildings( implementing and enforcing the stricter rules for design, construction, and occupation of HRBs),( 2) to raise safety standards of all buildings, and( 3) to promote and improve competence among professionals in design, construction, and building control.
Assessment & recommendations
The report claims that in it’ s current form, the BSR is not fit to handle the scale and complexity of applications that are required to fix the urban housing crisis. The report makes an initial recommendation to turn the BSR into a Fitch or Standard & Poor’ s type regulator
that stands equidistant between government and industry. The regulator, following investment from industry and run by a board of Government appointed experts, should have the resources to hire permanent teams of experts to administer regulations. These standing Multi-Disciplinary Teams should be well-remunerated and resourced to execute their jobs in a timely manner.
A number of other recommendations conclude the report. Key amongst these is the introduction of an electronic file management system, aiming to streamline manual processes and speed up approval times for applicants. The report also recommends the BSR should create a“ white-list” for certain entities, who utilise universally used proprietary materials in the supply chain, and fast track these within the application.
The report concludes that the BSR currently, in theory, provides the blueprint to build“ the safest building in the world”, but in reality blocks these safe buildings from being delivered. The conversation surrounding the BSR will always be nuanced and sensitive, as any conversation stemming from such a tragedy should be. The housing crisis currently gripping the UK is a tragedy in it’ s own right, and the argument is surely one to be heard if amendments could be made to preserve high-safety standards whilst also streamlining approval processes. What can not be aloud to happen is to solve the housing crisis with an influx of buildings that pose the same threat that Grenfell tower did, a threat that was allowed to fester until it made itself known. The full report and recommendations can be found at thinkhouse. org.
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