WELCOME BACK TO A NEW BAR YEAR!
Workersʼ Compensation Section
69A?= C-><9@>7C6@=B7CA;??8697??,??4>5=?0=+/<-
developing law limiting use of FCEs.
The First DCA recognized that
the JCC could have ordered the
employer/carrier to provide the
FCE as a medical benefit. Id.
But the First DCA noted that the
claimant didn’t want the FCE. The
First DCA went on to note that
there was no basis to force unwanted
medical care on a claimant:
There has never been any part
of the workers’ compensation law
that permits an E/C to force a
claimant to submit to treatment,
nor does any provision of law
brought to our attention permit
this court to bodily force an
injured employee to undergo
unwanted medical care.
Id.
The First District recognized
that the JCC could order an IME
in appropriate situations, but
it recognized that an IME is
performed by a duly qualified
physician, while an FCE is not
performed by a physician, nor does
it fit into the statutory scheme. The
First DCA also observed that an
order granting a claimant’s motion
for a court-ordered FCE had been
reversed on appeal in West Coast
Elevator v. Wood, 780 So. 2d 321
(Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Although the
decision does not foreclose the
possibility that an FCE could be
ordered or awarded in a different
cases, use of the FCE has been,
and will continue to be, limited.
In Ft. Walton Beach Medical
Center v. Tara Young, 1D16-2162
(Fla. 1st DCA July 14, 2017), the
First DCA reversed the JCC’s
award of permanent total disability
benefits, which was based on a
104-week statutory MMI date,
because it was contrary to the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision
in Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg,
194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016).
In Delgado v. City Concrete
Systems, Inc., 2017 WL 2438332
(Fla. 1st DCA June 6, 2017), the
First DCA, relying on the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in
Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192
So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016), held the
JCC’s disapproval of an attorney
fee stipulation without holding a
hearing and allowing the parties
to submit evidence denied the
claimant