Hazard Risk Resilience Magazine Volume 1 Issue 3 | Page 40

INTRO | HIGHLIGHTS | FEATURES | INTERVIEWS | PERSPECTIVES 41 Sport Mega Events are also widely televised, providing large sources of revenue for broadcasting corporations. Importantly, what is seen at the event is not always what is seen on TV, as any unintended interactions between fans and the sport event are normally ignored or censored from view, such as offensive language or other disturbances. In terms of surveillance, football stadiums in particular were used for the piloting of CCTV security systems in the UK before they were widely used across urban spaces from the early 1990s. At large televised football matches the many (audience) watch over the few (football players); in turn police/security view the crowd from CCTV control rooms to track and identify terrorists, hooligans or anyone looking suspicious. globalised networks of expertise, unable truly to challenge the reproduction of predefined security exemplars. Yet if the autonomy of local parliaments is limited, so is the scope of public debate: ...negotiations leading to the Host City Charter were a priori excluded from democratic scrutiny. (Klauser, F. 2011) In order to host the FIFA World Cup, governments must hand over exclusive rights and spaces to the organisation’s personnel and the corporations attached to them. A new security template is then put in place by FIFA. There is an imperative to generate profit at these kinds of events, which involves private corporate influence. When South Africa hosted FIFA in 2010 it also saw it as an opportunity to redefine itself. South Africa is the first African country ever to hold an international sports event as large as the FIFA World Cup. The World Cup took place in the vicinity of leisure and retail areas originating from gentrification; it was not held in a poorer residential area. Homeless people and unauthorised vendors were removed forcefully, as is the case in Above: 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. other cities hosting Sport Mega Events. But the levels of security in Cape Town had a variety of effects on a number of different levels. Crime was reported to have dropped during the football tournament, but then rose significantly after the security officers supplied by the World Cup left. There were also novel methods of security management developed through cooperation between the police and armed forces, but not all of the structures developed as a result of the World Cup remained in place. More CCTV cameras were installed in Johannesburg for the World Cup and an additional 100 cameras were put in place afterwards. Durban also installed 200 more cameras after the event. These surveillance initiatives which remained are used for urban security over the long-term with some linked to biometric databases. Thus there are post-security legacies established in countries that host Sport Mega Events like the World Cup, but especially in developing countries in terms of policing and electronic surveillance. In the case of Euro 2008 (UEFA European Football Championship), UEFA suspended claims of local businesses to spatial ownership, but also denied any public resistance within host cities. This is one of a number of examples that shows how although these events are indeed ‘public’, they are driven by private interests. The implementation of fan zones in Switzerland and Austria was permanently ‘guided’ by UEFA, meaning that host cities were coerced into accepting them. In terms of security policy, it is the technology companies themselves who are playing a greater role in governing Sport Mega Events. Private security companies not only implement surveillance technologies, but supply the personnel as well. If they continue to define security governance in terms of establishing ‘best practice’ how, if at all, will any input be allowed from public stakeholders, particularly local communities, for how security risks are governed in the future? It does not necessarily follow that privatisation equals less democracy, but private companies’ interests can have a tendency to muffle diverging critical viewpoints from outside, preventing any public scrutiny from taking place in a meaningful way. This model has also been followed by other countries in Europe, such as CCTV police surveillance intelligence used in Italy; this is in a sense an ‘exemplar’ of ‘best practice’ that transfers across national boundaries. Also, these kinds of sport events are far more focused on the ‘middle class’ in terms of accessibility. Stadiums have in a sense priced out the poor from attending football matches. This was to reclaim ‘safe urban spaces for respectable fans’. Instead of football matches being a culturally expressive and in some cases chaotic ‘carnivalesque’ event that dates back to the Middle Ages, they are now largely controlled, commercialised events. English Premier League stadiums are not only for football, but like other large public areas such as airports, have been transformed into shopping malls and high-profile conference suites that are part of the backdrop of luxury hotels, health clubs, bars, etc. The branding rights for the stadium are then sold to the highest bidder, which has become a norm in that many former public arenas are now labelled with consumer brands. This sets the tone for the way Sport Mega Events and other small or large public events are managed, not merely in terms of public safety, but in the interests of private business. Terrorist attacks have also left a lasting impression upon large urban centres where Sport Mega Events are held. Since 9/11 and especially since the 7/7 bombings, which occurred a mere 20 hours after the International Olympic Committee