Harvard International Review | Page 18

PERSPECTIVES Beijing’s Ménluó Doctrine If it was good for America, should it be good for China? PATRICK MENDIS is a distinguished senior fellow and affiliate professor at George Mason University’s School of Public Policy. A former American diplomat, Mendis is currently serving as a commissioner to the US National Commission for UNESCO at the US State Department. B eijing has an incremental foreign policy in the South and East China Seas which appears to parallel America’s Monroe Doctrine. When the increasingly assertive young America declared that the Western Hemisphere was off-limits to the great colonial powers of Europe, President James Monroe’s eponymous doctrine altered the nature of trans-Atlantic relations. In retrospect, China is essentially following America’s footprints in trans-Pacific affairs with its own Ménluó (a transliteration of Monroe) Doctrine in the Asian Seas. Beijing’s competing claims primarily involve the Diaoyu (or Senkaku in Japan) islands dispute with Tokyo, the Paracel (or Xisha in China, Hoang Sa in Vietnam) archipelagos conflict with Hanoi and the Scarborough shoal clash (or Huangyan island in China) along with the Second Thomas shoal (known as Ren’ai in China) with Manila. The ever-more powerful China has now engaged in a number of other territorial disagreements with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan over the resource-rich regions of the South China Sea. Beijing exclusively claims that a U-shaped swathe of this maritime region—just south of Hong Kong and Hainan Island—historically belongs to China. The disputed waters demarcated by the so-called “nine-dash-line” 18 on Chinese maps, which Beijing now puts on its Chinese passports, has elevated into an international issue. President Barack Obama seems to understand the delicacy of historical analog and future prospects for the Sino-American relationship—the most important bilateral relationship in the world. The evolving complexity ranges from the ever-changing regional and bilateral relations with nations in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to Myanmar and Japan. Now, it is with the Philippines and Vietnam. In April, a few days after making a strong statement about the US treaty obligations to defend Japan over the Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, Obama reiterated at a news conference in Manila that the Philippines and Vietnam should bring the disputed claims against China before an international tribunal under the Law of the Sea Treaty of the United Nations. During this four-nation tour of Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Obama emphasized the US commitment to the “rebalancing” policy in the Pacific, stating that “coercion and intimidation is [not] the way to manage these disputes.” Obama’s rebalancing policy, which was previously introduced as the “Asia pivot strategy” by former Secretary of State