Gold Magazine January - February 2014, Issue 34 | Página 45

Liem Hoang
Ngoc ΜΕP
(France)

“The European Parliament points especially to
the sharp increase in youth unemployment in
Greece, Cyprus and Portugal”

27 Considers that too little attention
has been given to alleviating the negative
impact of adjustment strategies in the
programme countries;
28 Stresses that national-level ownership
is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences
in terms of the expected results;

Troika –the institutional dimension
and democratic legitimacy
29 Notes that the Troika’s mandate has
been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency;
30 Points out that due to its ad hoc nature
there was no appropriate legal basis for
setting up the Troika on the basis of Union
primary law;
31 Notes the admission by the President
of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the
recommendations of the Troika without
considering their specific policy implications;
32 Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent
of Member States and an EU institution;
warns that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between
its role in the Troika and its responsibility
as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in
policies such as competition and state aid;
33 Points equally to a possible conflict of
interest between the current role of the
ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’
and its position as creditor of the four
Member States as well as its mandate under the Treaty;
34 Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM
Treaty that the Commission should work
‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing
the ECB’s role to that of a provider of
expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary
policy and that the involvement of the
ECB in any matter related to budgetary,
fiscal and structural policies is therefore on
uncertain legal ground;
35 Points to the generally weak democratic
accountability of the Troika in programme
countries at national level; notes however
that this democratic accountability varies

between countries, depending on the will
of national executives;
36 Notes that formal decisions are made
by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, with
a crucial role now given to the ESM as it
is the organisation responsible for deciding
on financial assistance, thus putting governments, including those of the Member
States directly concerned, at the centre of
any decisions taken;
37 Points to the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by nature, is bound by the
unanimity rule, and is subject to political
influence exerted by finance ministers,
heads of state and government as well as
national parliaments;

Proposals and Recommendations
38 Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU
to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on
European Union; takes the view that any
departure from the Community method
and increased use of intergovernmental
agreements would divide and weaken the
Union, including the euro area;
39 Stresses that the ESM should evolve
towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty
and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament
including with respect to decisions to
grant financial assistance, in order to exert
democratic accountability over the ESM;
40 Urges that in the short run consideration should be given to amending the
ESM Treaty in order to allow standard
decisions to be taken by a qualified majority rather than by unanimity, and to allow
for precautionary assistance to be given;
41 Calls for the involvement of social
partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current
and future;
42 Demands that the Troika take stock
of the current debate on fiscal multipliers
and consider the revision of MoUs on the
basis of the latest empirical results;
43 Is concerned, in particular, to improve
the accountability of the Commission
when it acts in its capacity as a member of
the Troika; requests that the Commission
representative(s) in the Troika should be

heard in the European Parliament before
taking up their duties and should be subject to regular reporting to the European
Parliament;
44 Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup,
amending MoUs with the Member States
receiving EU-IMF financial assistance to
include appropriate democratic accountability at both national and European
levels; calls for European guidelines to be
established in order to ensure appropriate
democratic control on the implementation of measures at national level;
45 Is of the opinion that the option of
a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143
TFEU to all Member States, instead of
being restricted to non-euro Member
States, should be explored ; similarly,
takes the view that the option of a Treaty
change to create a European Monetary
Fund within the Community framework
as an alternative to the IMF should also
be explored; further considers that other
issues to be evaluated include the current
institutional framework of the Troika, the
involvement of the ECB in the review of
the programmes and the mandatory involvement of the IMF in euro area financial assistance programmes as enshrined in
the ESM treaty;
46 Instructs its President to forward this
resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the European Central
Bank.

“The European
Parliament calls
for the involvement
of social partners
in the design and
implementation
of adjustment
programmes,
current and future”

the international investment, finance & professional services magazine of cyprus

Gold 45