Global Security and Intelligence Studies
mestic RWE is dominated by the government ’ s recognition of the problem and shortcomings in responding to it . Recognition of the problem has been slow in coming and has been led as much by local law enforcement departments as by federal agencies ( Bjelopera , 2017 ; Cunningham , 2007 ). Domestic RW extremists share many of the same radicalizing factors as Islamic extremists including social , economic , political , psychological or religious influences ( Carpenter et al ., 2009 ). The current surge in Domestic RWE is attributed in part to current economic and political trends including the election of the nation ’ s first African-American president and recent gun regulations ( Southers , 2013 ; Center for American Progress , 2012 ). Specific attention was paid to the risk posed by veterans returning from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars being especially susceptible to radicalization due to the great difficulties they face in community reintegration or even by being targeted for recruitment by extremist groups due to their military skill set ( Southers , 2013 ; Center for American Progress , 2012 ). Most actions toward CVE have been preoccupied with an exaggerated threat of Islamic homegrown terrorism , continuing a trend post 9 / 11 that has plagued Intelligence Community analysis since the Murrah Federal building bombing in 1985 ( Bjelopera , 2012 ; Corman , 2016 ; Sloan , 2016 ; Boggs & Pollard , 2006 ). This is reflective of mainstream views of terrorism at large , even the definition of “ domestic terrorism ” in the U . S . Patriot Act is offered only as an addendum to the perceived greater threat of international terrorism ( Quiney , 2007 ). Even as late as 2011 , Federal CVE strategy focused on the threat of homegrown Islamic terrorism to the exclusion of other groups ( Bjelopera , 2014 ; Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States , 2011 ). This is evident in efforts to stem the flow of funding to Islamist terror organizations , but a lack of programs targeting their domestic terror counterparts ( Keatinge et al ., 2019 ). This preoccupation with Islamic extremism seems especially misplaced in light of reports indicating Domestic RWE has accounted not only for more attacks than Islamic extremism , but also significantly more deaths in the US since 9 / 11 ( Ducol et al ., 2016 ; Center for American Progress , 2012 ). This trend is not unique to the United States either ; during the period from 1998 to 2005 , domestic terrorism accounted for 80 % of all terrorism deaths world-wide ( Sanchez-Cuenca & De La Calle , 2009 ). Part of this preoccupation may be due to the way Domestic RWE is conceived by federal security agencies .
Unlike international terrorism , there is no comprehensive list of domestic terrorist organizations nor of incidents of domestic terror ; instead , they are organized into a loose list of threats based off of contributing ideologies ( Alexander , 2017 ; Healy , 2010 ; Bjelopera , 2012 & 2017 ). This may be due in part to constitutional conflicts between the First Amendment and the leaderless resistance model commonly used to distance violent Domestic RW extremists from ideological organizations exercising their right to free speech ( Bjelopera , 2017 ). Further complicating any
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