Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 5, Number 1, Spring / Summer 2020 | Page 30

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
fense of our nation. It means taking the
downside risks of the light bulb more
seriously, and with a bit more caution,
as the long game is more important.
It may seem paradoxical, as
some may argue that acting in this sixth
domain will make us no better than
Russia or China—two anti-democratic
regimes, competing to be great powers.
We counter that the United States
exemplifies the democratization of information—upholding
liberal values of
democracy including free speech and
the free flow of information, something
Russia and China and many other
authoritarian regimes do not allow.
Both states use information operations
domestically to suppress dissent and
control what people think, whether
through manipulation or censorship, all
while exporting a particular model of
digital authoritarianism globally. Russia
and China illustrate the unintended
consequences of the digital information
age—the new paradigm scholars once
thought would give more power to the
people is instead being used to silence
and control them. Our adversaries have
weaponized information to control behavior
both at home and abroad, as a
method of normal politics, while Western
democracies tend to limit it to wartime
activity.
As we move forward with the
new realities of a digital world, information
will not only be critical to, but
also the key to, success in all domains.
Furthermore, the exponential growth
of technology and its widespread use
has ensured that those who take part
in information war are individuals, and
not just armed forces. Advanced technology
such as deep fakes, artificial intelligence,
and 5G network speed will
further refine cyber-enabled psychological
operations, having profound
effects on information warfare in particular
and allowing us to recognize its
new role in offensive and defensive operations.
Yet the speed by which we act
is not yet sufficient, and is instead reactive
and inductive. Certainly, this is not
to downplay the complexity of dealing
with new types of warfare. In the real
world, resources are often stretched and
responses to adversarial behavior will
probably always err on the side of being
reactive rather than proactive. What
matters most is that when we see these
developments unfolding, we create the
proper frameworks for addressing each
individual problem area. Doing so will
ensure the continuation of proper attention
and resources being dedicated
to combating new threats as they arise.
Disclaimer
The views presented in this article are
those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of USSTRAT-
COM, the US Air Force, the DoD, or
the US Government.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Brian Burke and Tommy
Nimrod, for their thoughtful expertise
in regards to the information environment
and psychology, respectively, in
guiding this research.
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