Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 5, Number 1, Spring / Summer 2020 | Page 28

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
cyber-enabled psychological warfare
takes advantage of the vulnerabilities
created by the limitations of the human
mind. These same individuals are what
constitute the core of democratic societies,
making this issue fundamental to
the United States. However, defending
democracy is not just a job that falls to
individuals or to businesses—it is a national
security issue that demands the
attention and resources of our defense
infrastructure.
First, the establishment of the
psychological domain will undoubtedly
encourage investment in further
research, discussion, and resources,
including personnel and appropriate
infrastructure. In conflict, there
is always an advantage to the side that
understands and operates within a domain
better than the opponent (Allen
and Gilbert 2018). Distinguishing effects
carried out within domains in the
information environment allows for
the proper framework to carry out and
assess operations, while sharing best
practices. Planners and decision-makers
can strengthen the effectiveness
and efficiency of these operations, using
common language, methods, and
capabilities. The US government needs
to devote substantially more effort to
understanding the science and practice
of psychological operations, as they are
not synonymous with cyber operations.
Cyber operations are intended to hack
silicon-based processors and technology,
while psychological operations are
intended to hack carbon-based processors—that
is, human brains. If an organization’s
expertise is primarily with the
former, how can it execute operations
intended to optimize the outcomes of
the latter (Lin 2020)? What is required
is expertise on social cognition and behavioral
economics—the fundamental
psychological science underlying influence
campaigns—along with social
network analysis, decision analysis, and
the human aspects of command and
control.
By recognizing the psychological
domain, it gives credibility to the
idea and will lead to the further development
of a body of literature on the
subject and, ultimately, a deeper understanding
of the problem. This is not
just exclusive to the United States, but
could be an international effort as well.
When the United States recognized cyber
as a domain, NATO soon followed
suit, and a vast amount of research naturally
followed thereafter. This does
not necessarily mean there will be an
immediate consensus, but in the case
of the cyber domain, it created a legitimate
space to begin the development of
a broader conversation. In many ways,
this conversation has already begun;
however, as we have argued throughout
this paper, the conversation is not
being framed effectively. The way that
the government frames national security
issues often has a substantial impact
on how organizations that are trying to
offer their support or on how academics
trying to add to the literature put
forth their own contributions. The fact
that the United States, and many other
Western states, draw upon the public’s
knowledge as input to the larger policy
discussion is a strength that many of
our adversaries do not take advantage
of. There is incredible potential in en-
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