The Neglected Dimension of Ideology in Russia ’ s Political Warfare Against the West
Russia is now fighting for a multi-polar world that it seeks to create by unifying Eurasia and by putting into place alternative global institutions . Russia spearheaded the BRICS summits since 2009 , which is an annual economic forum and international organization , bringing together Brazil , Russia , India , China , and South Africa . In 2015 , Russia established the Eurasian Economic Union , which consists of Russia , Armenia , Belarus , Kazakhstan , and Kyrgyzstan , “ which has Dugin ’ s intellectual fingerprints all over it ” and which seems to be the main instrument for implementing its vision of a multipolar world ( Tolstoy and McCaffrey 2015 ). Although Dugin suggested to seek a closer partnership with Japan since China was a geopolitical rival and a base for Atlanticism , the Kremlin has opted for closer security and trade relations with China ( Van Herpen 2016 , 193 ).
Putin has frequently referred to Russia as a “ state-civilization ” and he has also rejected the notion that Russia would be in an ideological conflict with West , arguing that there were “ culture-logical ” or civilizational differences shaping relations between Russia and the West ( Tsyngankov 2016 , 146 ). By redefining Russia as being not only a state , but a state-civilization Russian ideology can solve several problems at once . Russia as a state compromised of multiple ethnicities , religious groups , and nationalities cannot invoke Russian ethnic nationalism without the risk of the country falling apart . It is the goal of Russian elites to maintain the Russian state in its present geography while expanding its influence by setting itself up as the leader of an Orthodox civilization that comprises many states , mostly in the former Soviet space . This way Russia can violate the sovereignty of countries in its civilizational space while insisting on its own sovereignty being sacrosanct . It has been pointed out by Steven Fish that the Russian leadership is deliberately ethnically very inclusive and that Putin has made strides to appease ethnic and religious minorities ( Fish 2017 , 66 – 67 ). Russian nationalism has steered clear of ethnic chauvinism and is interpreted as “ patriotism ” or a commitment to the authority and well-being of the Russian state . As a result , it would be inaccurate to describe Russian ideology as fascist since it clearly lacks the racist , if not anti-semitic , aspects of fascism and national socialism . At the same time , there is some apparent anti-semitism that can be found in Neo-Eurasianism and its proponents ( Snyder 2018 , 91 – 93 ).
In terms of ideology , Russia ’ s message of multi-polarity , anti-globalization , and rejection of American hegemony is appealing to many people around the world . Russian propaganda has targeted Western interventionism as imperialism and has pointed out that U . S . interventions in countries like Iraq , Afghanistan , Libya , and Syria have been highly destabilizing for the international system . Even many U . S . allies have become suspicious of U . S . intentions in the aftermath of the Iraq War , the drone wars , and the Snowden revelations . There is a growing nationalist sentiment in many Western countries that Russia seems to be nurturing in the hope of undermining Atlanticism . Russia has supported Western politicians
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