The Neglected Dimension of Ideology in Russia ’ s Political Warfare Against the West
identity , and its national and cultural identity have already become battlegrounds . The first step in this direction is the discrediting of and then the destruction of a nation ’ s values . And in order for external aggression to be perceived painlessly to the mass consciousness , it must be perceived as movement along the path of progress ” ( quoted from Blank 2013 , 33 ).
In particular , Russian national security elites became concerned about Western influences on the Russian youth through Western media and the Internet , the introduction of damaging values and attitudes that undermine Russian identity , and the threat of political and societal destabilization through what has been later termed “ color revolutions ” or popular uprisings at Russia ’ s periphery that overthrow governments and replace them with pro-Western governments ( Karyakin 2013 ).
These are not fringe ideas but they are actually echoed in official Russian policy documents . For example , the Russian Information Security Doctrine from 2000 already contained ideas regarding the new informational and hybrid war threat ( also emphasized in Russia ’ s 2014 military doctrine ). The Information Security Doctrine argues that information has become a key factor in societal development and that “ the national security of the Russian Federation substantially depends on the level of information security .” As a major threat , it lists “ illegal use of special means of influence on individual , group and public consciousness ”; the “ ousting of Russian news agencies and media from the national information market , and an increase in dependence of the spiritual , economic and political areas of public life in Russia on foreign information entities ”; and the “ depreciation of spiritual values , the propaganda of specimens of mass culture based on the cult of violence or on spiritual and moral values contrary to the values adopted in Russian society ” ( Russian Federation 2000 ).
Stephen Blank has characterized Russian paranoia over Western influence on Russian society as a “ domestic counterinsurgency ” since it would lend legitimacy to employing information warfare and other measures for internal repression ( Blank 2014 ). The Russian government has apparently decided that the best way of fighting harmful Western influence on Russian society is by waging information warfare against the West . In fact , Russian active measures campaigns in the West have continued throughout the post-Cold War era and may have intensified over the last decade ( Abrams 2016 , 17 – 18 ). After the election of Vladimir Putin as president in 2000 , Russia has strengthened its “ soft power ” by establishing the foreign language TV news channel Russia Today , as well as setting up Internet news websites like Sputnik News ( formerly RIA Novosti ) and Ruptly . At one point , the budget for Russia Today exceeded $ 300 million and it represents a substantial investment in strengthening the Russian media presence abroad ( Diamond , Plattner , and Walker 2016 , 51 ). Russia Today ( rebranded as RT in 2009 ) has 21 offices in 16 countries , including in London , Washington , DC , Berlin , and Paris broadcasting
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