Introduction
The Neglected Dimension of Ideology in Russia ’ s Political Warfare Against the West
As late as 2014 , President Obama claimed that the current tensions with
Russia would not be “ another Cold War that we ’ re entering into … After all , unlike the Soviet Union , Russia leads no bloc of nations , no global ideology . The United States and NATO do not seek any conflict with Russia . In fact , for more than 60 years we have come together in NATO not to claim other lands but to keep nations free ” ( Miller 2014 ). Now , 5 years later , there is a growing realization by Western foreign policy elites that the conflict with Russia is of a more permanent nature and has great similarities to the original Cold War . In 2018 , the President of the influential Council on Foreign Relations , Richard Haas , acknowledged “[ a ] quarter-century after the end of the Cold War , we unexpectedly find ourselves in a second one ” ( Haas 2018 ). Many other analysts and journalists have similarly claimed that there is a return of a Cold War relationship between the West and Russia ( Conradi 2017 ; Legvold 2016 ; Lucas 2008 ). Russia is increasingly seen as a revanchist and revisionist power that seeks to challenge U . S . hegemony by waging a political war against the West ( Nance 2018 ).
However , unlike the original Cold War , which is widely understood as an ideological conflict that pitted liberal democracy against communism , it has been claimed that the new Cold War completely lacks any ideological dimension . According to Peter Pomerantsev , the Kremlin has no distinctive ideology or rather that its ideology would be the belief that “ there is no truth .” In Pomerantsev ’ s view , Russia discarded any attempt of having a consistent ideology in favor of the aim to “ own all forms of political discourse ” by “ climb [ ing ] inside all ideologies and movements , exploiting and rendering them absurd ” ( Pomerantsev 2015 , 67 ). Similarly , the Washington Post claimed : “ The rule-by-fear is Soviet , but this time there is no ideology — only a noxious mixture of personal aggrandizement , xenophobia , homophobia and primitive anti-Americanism ” ( Hiatt 2013 ). Analyst Benn Steil has suggested that “ Russia ’ s conflict with the West is about geography , not ideology ,” as Russia would merely try to preserve its sphere of influence against NATO encroachment ( Steil 2018 ).
In contrast , other Russia specialists have claimed that Russia has simply turned fascist , which has been blamed for the current crisis in relations with the West . For example , historian Timothy Snyder argued that “[ f ] ascist ideas burst into the Russian public sphere during the Obama administration ’ s attempt to ‘ reset ’ relations with the Russian Federation ” and that “[ t ] he dramatic change in Russia ’ s orientation bore no relation to any new unfriendly action from the outside ” ( Snyder 2018 , 91 ). The main argument for describing Russian ideology as fascist is the fact that the Russian state is both nationalist and authoritarian and that there is a cult of personality with respect to Putin himself ( Snegovaya 2017 , 43 ). In particular , some analysts have noted the surprising political revival of the Russian far-right or “ fascist ” philosopher Ivan Ilyin in Putin ’ s Russia in recent years ( Laqueur 2015 , 177 ).
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