Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 3, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2018 | Page 38

Strategic Warning and Anticipating Surprise: Assessing the Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts
Background to the Problem
There has been an ongoing debate within the IC for many years on whether
intelligence analysis is tradecraft (art) or science (Marrin 2009; Lahneman
and Arcos 2014; Bruce and George 2015; Landon-Murray and Coulthart
2016). Much of the controversy lies in how one views intelligence analysis; is it
similar to academic research, where students can learn the basic skills necessary to
conduct academic inquiry, applying analytical tools or techniques through qualitative
or quantitative scientific methods, or is it more of an art, or the process of
tradecraft learned over time and practice, based on experience, direct observation,
and “gut instincts” that can only be acquired through lifelong work in the IC?
In other words, the debate can be framed in the context of a hypothetical: can
a 22-year veteran intelligence analyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
who has served in the US military during the Cold War and studied the Russian
military his or her entire career be replaced by a 22 year-old college graduate,
who has majored in Intelligence Studies and taken courses in intelligence analysis?
While the literal answer may be yes, the larger question to be answered is whether
through education and training, new intelligence analysts can possess the capacity
to learn the job quickly and be technically proficient in order to be able to produce
strategic intelligence assessments which anticipate surprise and provide strategic
warning. If so, then what are the knowledge, skills, and abilities students need
to learn in coursework which focuses specifically on intelligence analysis during
their college years?
We must also define what we mean by “strategic surprise.” Jack Davis argues
that strategic surprise is really the lack of strategic warning, which is the “inability
of the intelligence community to focus on long-term developments that, when
brought to the attention of policy-makers, will allow officials to redirect resources,
formulate contingency plans, establish new programs, form new relationships, and
otherwise meaningfully prepare for new conditions and trends” (Haddick 2012).
Colin Gray (2005) argues that the issue is not “surprise” but rather “effect” of a
strategic event and how the geopolitical context often dictates the outcome of the
“strategic surprise.” He also states that throughout history, strategic surprise has
not dictated the outcomes of war or conflict, and military strategy or transformation
should not overreact to such events when they occur. Thus, strategic surprise,
by itself, may not be the problem, but rather how institutions and policy-makers
(intelligence, defense, Presidents, Congress, etc.) respond when such events
like 9/11 occur. Kettl (2013) calls them “policy lighting” events since they often
produce major policy changes and bureaucratic responses, such as the Homeland
Security Act (2002), Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act Reform
(2004), and the subsequent standup of the Department of Homeland Security, Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, etc. These in and of themselves have
not necessarily improved intelligence analysis, or the ability to anticipate strategic
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