Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 92

Global Security and Intelligence Studies 2004, Nigeria’s defense minister paid a state visit to China. China reciprocated by, among other things, agreeing to supply new combat jets to Nigeria, signing a contract with Nigeria’s defense ministry worth over $250 million to transfer 15 Chengdu F/FT- 7NI aircrafts in 2005 (Chau 2007). Transfers of sophisticated Chinese arms are usually followed by training of African military personnel on how to use them. Accordingly, in 2006 several Nigerian pilots traveled to China to undergo training on the use of the new aircrafts. In addition to the transfer of aircrafts, China also transferred air-to-air missiles, rockets, and anti-tank bombs, among others, worth $32 million. Between 2004 and 2006 other arms transfer or military assistance agreements between China and Nigeria were worth over $70 million involving supplies of patrol boats, trainer and fighter aircraft, and military transports. There are several other examples of China cementing its relationship with African countries through military assistance. Among the many examples is China’s donation of $43 million worth of military equipment to Nigeria in October 2005. The equipment ranged from uniforms, communication technology, bullet proof helmets and vests, to computers, among other things (Enuka 2011). China did not just transfer this equipment to Nigeria, but the transfer was later followed by several Chinese military experts whose mission was to train Nigerian military personnel on how to use the donated equipment. Within the past decade, the 10 African countries with the highest level of military cooperation with China are Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Alessi and Xu 2015). Although the value of arms transfers from China to Africa could be described as modest compared to trade in oil and other commodities, military interactions are carried out through high level political delegations, while arms transfers and high level bilateral ties are used as instruments to help secure more economic access to critical raw materials. Since the end of the 1990s high level military delegations have been a regular occurrence between Beijing and several African countries. Of the 10 countries engaged in high levels of military cooperation with China, six of them are either suppliers of oil, gas, and other critical resources, or they have substantial Chinese commercial investments. This places China–Africa weapons transfers and military cooperation into two distinct dimensions: (1) countries with strategic minerals like Sudan and Nigeria, and South Africa, and the Democratic Republic of Congo; and (2) anchor states/regional influentials/sub-regional hegemons like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia, among others. In some cases there is an overlap between the two where geo-economic countries like Sudan, Nigeria, and South Africa are also regional hegemons. China’s Arms Sales Strategy to Africa During the 1990s, Chinese weapons were considered to be substandard in firepower and offensive capability vis à vis the most simplistic, low-tech military armaments available, and limited to a defensive capacity, having only “nuisance value” (Bitzinger 1991). Consequently, Chinese weapons exports were limited to less than 10%. However, Chinese arms sales, especially in Africa, have increased. China has aggressively marketed its weapons to poorer and less technologically advanced 86