Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 81

An Assessment of Lone Wolves Using Explosive-Laden Consumer Drones in the United States
Legislation and Increased Collaboration for Geofencing Firmware
To date, no United States laws require drone manufacturers to incorporate
geofencing into their firmware. Following the quadcopter incident on the White
House lawn in 2015, DJI emphasized geofencing and pushed a “mandatory firmware
update” but even then, its geofenced areas only include airports and the White
House (Poulsen 2015). This cost-effective method to restrict drone flight can greatly
contribute to protection of long-term static targets, but may also protect short-term
static and mobile targets through proper coordination. Senator Chuck Shumer (D-
NY) introduced an amendment to the FAA Reauthorization bill last year stating, “If
geo-fencing technology were mandated in every drone sold in America,” it would
“effectively fence off drones from sensitive areas like airports, the Pentagon and major
sporting events like the United States Open and more” (Laing 2015). The bill failed,
but politicians should continue to investigate the benefits of geofencing and push for
requirements in newly manufactured drone models, such as firmware and mandatory
periodic updates to incorporate new geofences, as this passive feature can slow down
or prevent attacks conducted by unsophisticated lone wolves unable to bypass or
circumvent firmware.
Drone manufacturers are responsible for most of the recent progress in
geofencing efforts. DJI recognizes the utility of this feature and plans to implement as
many as 10,000 no-fly zones for airports and some national borders in the future, but
the United States Government should collaborate with DJI for additional no-fly zones
over other sensitive locations (Poulsen 2015). Geofencing can mainly benefit longterm
static targets, but government agencies have failed to feed information to drone
manufacturers developing firmware and constructing geofences. The Department
of Homeland Security’s Protective Security Coordination Division, which conducts
vulnerability assessments for sites of 16 different critical infrastructure sectors, should
collaborate with DJI and other drone manufacturers to implement new no-fly zones
over these sensitive sites (“Critical Infrastructure” 2016). Such collaboration can
significantly enhance the security of long-term static targets across the United States
in a relatively short amount of time.
Increased Focus in Academia
There is certainly potential for further research and analysis on this looming
threat. Between September 2013 and the January 2015 quadcopter incident at the
White House, the National Counterterrorism Center’s working group on drones grew
from four members to 65, reflecting its concern for terrorists’ use of drones (Schmidt
and Shear 2015). Similarly, some academic institutions developed specific groups
to investigate and analyze drones, such as the Center for the Study of the Drone at
Bard College, but there is room for continued growth in this new field of study. Lt.
Col. (Ret.) Mitchell [last name withheld], former Chief of MQ-1 Training for a USAF
Special Operations Squadron, suggested, “a study should be considered where they
hire someone and say—“Go buy one [a drone] and see what you can do.” This kind of
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