Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 104

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
interests or economic ties with African states. Because bilateral economic activities
are the greatest focus of China in Africa, peacekeeping and security issues have not
yet been discussed with sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa. Outright or significant commitment
by China for a more effective African Union or an African security force may be slow in
coming. However, some Chinese scholars have proposed the idea of an African Peace
Fund as a key condition for more effective African peacekeeping efforts. China would
most likely prefer to work with the UN in its efforts to contribute to African peace and
security. While African sub-regional organizations and the AU can collectively put
pressure on China to do more in the area of security and peace in Africa, it appears
that China will continue to improve its record on peacekeeping via the UN and its
peacekeeping missions in Africa as a way of counteracting the accusations that it is
flooding Africa with small arms that are used in many of the ongoing conflicts.
The current levels of China’s peacekeeping activities in Africa have had a
positive impact because of the level of infrastructure development and medical work
performed by Chinese peacekeepers. However, some of the potential obstacles to an
expanded Chinese peacekeeping effort would be: (1) the issue of what constitutes
legitimate intervention; and (2) China’s role in arms transfers that help fuel conflicts in
contrast to its peacekeeping activities. Positive developments are that China is becoming
more flexible with regard to the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping interventions, and it is
at times even advocating within the UN Security Council use of peace-enforcement in
situations of gross violations of human rights and humanitarian crisis.
While China supplies a significant number of weapons to states with critical
resources with which it maintains strong trading ties, there are also states such as
Ghana or Uganda which are not significant in terms of exporting critical resources
to China, but maintain strong military ties with China. This means that China is also
using arms transfers as a means of enhancing its commercial profits. Arms transfers
whether they generate positive or negative effects are simply part of the multipronged
diplomatic strategy of China toward Africa. Other dimensions of China’s multiple
diplomacy are in the areas of aid, trade, investment, health education, and culture.
The arms transfer sector is increasing in scope but still lags far behind the aid, trade,
and investment strategy. Arms transfers therefore, play the dual role of consolidating
relationships/ties with African states, and to some extent, acting as a commercial end
in itself.
Finally, the argument can be made that because African armies are poorly
equipped and underfunded, Chinese military aid is beneficial to them because it helps
uphold the internal integrity, if not territorial integrity of African states. However, on
a more critical level, the virtual lack of interstate wars among African states results in
regimes using weapons for self-preservation purposes. Such was the case in Guinea.
Overall, China is likely to expand and intensify its military relationships with Africa
via arms transfers, military attaches, high level military exchanges and meetings, and
even joint military exercises.
On a more critical reflection, the African security implications of China’s
seemingly contradictory role in Africa is manifested in a rhetoric of non-interference
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